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I. INTRODUCTION: THE NEW NEW TECHNOLOGY 
By design, the law is reactive. Development of the law is driven by 
developments in technology, particularly by those which are publicly 
perceived as breakthrough developments. For example, the announcement 
of the successful cloning of a sheep from a mature somatic cell prompted 
calls for new legislation and reexamination of existing laws governing 
everything from the funding of biomedical research to the definition of 
human life. The realization that the Internet is transforming 
communications has likewise prompted new legislation and reexamination 
of existing laws governing everything from fundamental concepts of 
presence and jurisdiction to personal privacy. 
Considerable recent attention has been devoted to United States patent 
law, in part because of interest in global harmonization of intellectual 
property laws, and in part because of the growth of the intellectual 
economy and the concomitant increase in interest in the methods of 
protecting intellectual property. It has gone unnoticed, however, that a 
fundamental principle of United States patent law-the refusal to grant 
patents on inventions which have entered the public domain-needs 
reexamination in light of the Internet's rapid development. The Manual of 
Patent Examining Procedure (MPEP),l the United States Patent Office's 
guidance document for the examination of patent applications, is silent on 
the use of Internet materials as "printed publications" (a major category of 
documents which help defme the public domain) in deciding patentability. 
There appears to be no published analysis of whether the Internet is a 
medium of "printed publications" either in the general literature or in the 
United States Patent Office's policy documents. A moment's consideration 
of the amount of information on the Internet, compared to the amount of 
information in books and magazines, and a second moment's conjecture 
as to the relative amounts of information in these media in the future, 
should make clear the importance of such an analysis. In 1980, a researcher 
looking for public information would have relied principally on books and 
magazines in a library; in 2002, the researcher will rely principally on 
1. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, MANUAL OF PATENT 
EXAMINING PROCEDURE (6th ed. rev. 3 1997). 
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electronic sources, including Internet Web pages, news group archives, 
online databases, and whatever new resources the next three years bring. 
For those who are late to the revolution, an excellent (if already 
outdated) introduction to the capabilities of the Internet is given in Justice 
Stevens' opinion in Reno v. American Civil Liberties Union:2 
The Internet is an international network of interconnected 
computers .... 
The Internet has experienced "extraordinary growth." The 
number of "host" computers ... increased from about 300 in 
1981 to approximately 9,400,000 by the time of the trial in 
1996. . .. About 40 million people used the Internet at the 
time of trial, a number that is expected to mushroom to 200 
million by 1999. 
Individuals can obtain access to the Internet from many 
different sources .... Most colleges and universities provide 
access for their students and faculty; many corporations 
provide their employees with access through an office 
network; many communities and local libraries provide free 
access; and an increasing number of storefront "computer 
coffee shops" provide access for a small hourly fee. Several 
major national "online services" such as America Online, 
CompuServe, the Microsoft Network, and Prodigy offer 
access to their own extensive proprietary networks as well as 
a link to the much larger resources of the Internet. These 
commercial online services had almost 12 million individual 
subscribers at the time of trial. 
Anyone with access to the Internet may take advantage of 
a wide variety of communication and information retrieval 
methods. These methods are constantly evolving .... All of 
these methods can be used to transmit text; most can transmit 
sound, pictures, and moving video images. Taken together, 
these tools constitute a unique medium-known to its users 
as "cyberspace"-located in no particular geographical 
location but available to anyone, anywhere in the world, with 
access to the Internet. 
E-mail enables an individual to send an electronic message 
... to another individual or to a group of addressees .... A 
mail exploder is a sort of e-mail group. Subscribers can send 
messages to a common e-mail address, which then forwards 
the message to the group's other subscribers. Newsgroups 
also serve groups of regular participants, but these postings 
may be read by others as well. There are thousands of such 
2. 117 S. Ct. 2329 (1997) (striking down the first federal legislative response to' the 
Internet). 
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groups .... About 100,000 new messages are posted every 
day. In most newsgroups, postings are automatically purged 
at regular intervals .... [T]wo or more individuals wishing to 
communicate more immediately can enter a chat room to 
engage in real-time dialogue-in other words, by typing 
messages to one another that appear almost immediately on 
the others' computer screens. The District Court found that at 
any given time "tens of thousands of users are engaging in 
conversations on a huge range of subjects." ... 
The best known category of communication over the 
Internet is the World Wide Web, which allows users to search 
for and retrieve information stored in remote computers .... 
In concrete terms, the Web consists of a vast number of 
documents stored in different computers allover the world. 
Some of these documents are simply files containing 
information. However, more elaborate documents, commonly 
known as Web "pages," are also prevalent. Each has its own 
address-"rather like a telephone number." ... They 
generally also contain "links" to other documents created by 
that site's author or to other (generally) related sites .... 
Navigating the Web is relatively straightforward. A user 
may either type the address of a known page or enter one or 
more keywords into a commercial "search engine" in an effort 
to locate sites on a subject of interest. A particular Web page 
may contain the information sought by the "surfer," or, 
through its links, it may be an avenue to other documents 
located anywhere on the Internet. ... Access to most Web 
pages is freely available, but some allow access only to those 
who have purchased the right from a commercial provider. 
The Web is thus comparable, from the readers' viewpoint, to 
both a vast library including millions of readily available and 
indexed publications and a sprawling mall offering goods and 
services. 
From the publishers' point of view, it constitutes a vast 
platform from which to address and hear from a world-wide 
audience of millions of readers, viewers, researchers, and 
buyers. Any person or organization with a computer 
connected to the Internet can "publish" information. . . . 
Publishers may either make their material available to the 
entire pool of Internet users, or confine access to a selected 
group, such as those willing to pay for the privilege. "No 
single organization controls any membership in the Web, nor 
is there any centralized point from which individual Web sites 
or services can be blocked from the Web.,,3 
3. Id. at 2334-36 (footnotes omitted). 
[Vol. 51 
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Justice Stevens has described the Internet, in a non-patent context, as 
"a vast library including millions of readily available and indexed 
publications.'04 In the patent context, however, current caselaw would 
exclude this vast library from the definition of "printed publications" since 
the Internet, as currently structured, does not meet the court-imposed 
requirements that a "printed publication" be accessible and indexed. Thus, 
the principal research tool of the next decade would not, as currently 
constituted, be considered part of the public domain for purposes of 
limiting claims to patentability. 
Understanding this counterintuitive result begins with article I, section 
8, clause 8 of the United States Constitution, which empowers Congress 
"[t]o promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for 
limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their 
respective Writings and Discoveries."s This power is implemented by 35 
U.S.C. § 101, which provides: "Whoeverinvents or discovers any new and 
useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any 
new and useful improvement thereof, may obtain a patent therefor, subject 
to the conditions and requirements of this title.',6 
United States patent policy rewards inventors with a patent in exchange 
for providing the public with information which was not previously 
available to it.7 This underlying policy is implemented by the novelty 
requirements of 35 U.S.C. § 1028 and the non-obviousness requirements 
of 35 U.S.C. § 103.9 Taken together, these sections bar patentability of 
4. Id. at 2335. 
5. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cI. 8. 
6. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (1994). 
7. See United States v. Dubilier Condenser Corp., 289 U.S. 178, 186 (1933). See generally 
In re Bayer, 568 F.2d 1357, 1359-60 (C.C.P.A. 1978) (discussing why patents are not granted for 
publicly available infonnation). 
8. 35 U.S.C. § 102 provides: 
A person shall be entitled to a patent unless-
(a) the invention was known or used by others in this country, or patented or 
described in a printed publication in this or a foreign country, before the 
invention thereof by the applicant for patent, or 
(b) the invention was patented or described in a printed publication in this or 
a foreign country or in public use or on sale in this country, more than one 
year prior to the date of the application for patent in the United States •••• 
35 U.S.C. § 102 (1994). 
9. 35 U.S.C. § 103 provides: 
A patent may not be obtained though the invention is not identically disclosed 
or described as set forth in section 102 of this title, if the differences between the 
subject matter sought to be patented and the prior art are such that the subject 
matter as a whole would have been obvious at the time the invention was made to 
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inventions, knowledge of which is already in the public domain, or which 
are obvious in light of knowledge already in the public domain. lo 
A principal source of evidence of what is in the public domain is 
"printed pUblications," also referred to as "references." Section 102(a) bars 
patentability if the invention was described in a printed publication prior 
to the applicant's date of invention; section 1 02(b) bars patentability if the 
invention was described in a printed pUblication more than one year prior 
to the applicant's filing a patent application.ll A claimed invention which 
is barred by section 102(a) is referred to as "anticipated" by the section 
102(a) reference. "An anticipating reference must bear within its four 
comers adequate directions for the practice of the invention."12 
Congress' choice of the seemingly redundant phrase "printed 
publication" has troubled courts and led to inconsistent resolutions of the 
twin questions: "when is a publication printed?" and "when is a printing 
published?" Although the law on the issue has been described as "a 
muddled mess,,,13 two main interpretations have emerged: the statutory 
standard requires "publication," and "printed" is therefore surplusage; and 
the statutory standard requires "printing" as well as "publication." Modem 
a person having ordinary skill in the art to which said subject matter pertains. 
35 U.S.C. § 103 (1994). 
10. Throughout this Article, "public domain" refers to information about an invention; 
whether the invention itself is in the public domain depends on whether it was patented and, if so, 
whether the patent has expired. 
11. See itl. § 102. The publication must be sufficiently detailed to enable others to practice 
the invention. Verdegaal Bros., Inc. v. Union Oil Co., 814 F.2d 628, 631-32 (Fed. Cir. 1987). The 
date which would bar patentability (i.e., the day prior to the date of invention, or the day one year 
and one day prior to filing the patent application) is known as the "critical date"; the time period 
(i.e., one year) is referred to as the "grace period." The grace period has been varied, and differs 
depending on the type of patent being sought. All of the cases cited herein deal with "utility 
patents." Most countries other than the United States follow a rule of "absolute novelty" and do not 
provide a grace period. 
12. General Tire & Rubber Co. v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 349 F. Supp. 345, 356 (N.D. 
Ohio 1972)(citing Dewey & Almy Chern. Co. v. Mimex Co., 124 F.2d 986, 989-90 (2d Cir. 1942); 
Lincoln Stores, Inc. v.NashuaMfg.Co., 157F.2d 154, 159-60 (lstCir. 1946); Gordon Form Lathe 
Co. v. Walcott Mach. Co., 32 F.2d 55, 58 (6th Cir. 1929); Morgan Const. Co. v. 
WeIlman-Seaver-Morgan Co., 18 F.2d 395, 399 (6th Cir. 1927); and Munising Paper Co. v. 
American Sulphite Pulp Co., 228 F. 700, 703-04 (6th Cir. 1915». 
13. Wesley Kobylak, Annotation, Meaning ofTenn "Printed Publication" Under 35 U.S.C. 
§ 102(a) and (b), Denying Patentability to Invention Described in Printed Publication Before 
Invention by Applicant or More than One Year Prior to Date of Patent Application, 70 A.L.R. FED. 
796, 803 (1984); see also I.C.E. Corp. v. Armco Steel Corp., 250 F. Supp. 738,741 (S.D.N.Y. 
1966) (stating that courts have failed to enunciate a uniform standard of what constitutes a 
"publication" and of what is "printed"). A more sympathetic interpretation is offered in In re Hall: 
"The § 102 pUblication bar is a legal determination based on underlying fact issues, and therefore 
must be approached on a case-by-case basis." In re Hall, 781 F.2d 897, 899 (Fed. Cir. 1986). 
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cases have tended to focus on "publication," in the sense that the document 
in question is available to a significant segment of the public, with little 
regard for the document's form of dissemination (although all cases to date 
have involved information in some tangible form).14 
The development of the Internet requires a reexamination of the old 
questions in a new context: is information which has been posted15 to a 
Web page or other public forum on the Internet a "printed publication" 
under section 102? Including Internet postings as "printed publications" 
would greatly expand the amount of information which must be analyzed 
in order to determine patentability of inventions. Excluding Internet 
postings would, in the near future, likely exclude a significant portion of 
cutting edge technological information from the public domain. This 
Article will demonstrate that, under the current state of the caselaw and 
given the current structure of the Internet, information posted to the 
Internet cannot be considered a "printed publication.,,16 It will then propose 
changes which might be made in the patent statute or in the Internet itself 
in order for Internet postings to qualify as "printed publications." 
14. See Kobylak, supra note 13, at 86 (Supp. 1997) (citing Mobil Oil Corp. v. Amoco 
Chemicals Corp., 779 F. Supp. 1429 (D. Del. 1991); Gerald Rose, Do you have a "Printed 
Publication?" If Not, Do You Have Evidence of Prior "Knowledge or Use?", 61 J. PAT. OFF. 
SOC'y 643,650-51 (1979». 
15. The term "posting" is used herein to mean placing information on a computer which is 
accessible to the public (although not necessarily. the entire public) via the Internet and would 
include the current technologies of electronic mailing to a newsgroup or usenet, or a hypertext link 
from a World Wide Web page. 
16. It is important to point out issues which are not posed by Internet posting: there is no 
reason to suggest that posting removes anything from the public domain. Three cases must be 
considered. 
In the first case, an original document satisfies the definition of printed publication because it 
has been printed and widely disseminated, for example, a journal article. A copy of the document 
is posted on the Internet. Clearly, the posting does nothing to withdraw the original from the public 
domain, and the original document remains a printed publication-it is irrelevant whether the 
Internet posting is a printed publication or not. 
In the second case, an original document satisfies the definition of printed publication because 
it is printed and a copy is publicly available, properly indexed, and accessible to the interested 
public. Posting a copy of the index would, again, not remove anything from the public domain and 
the posted index is irrelevant. 
In the third caSe, an original document is publicly available only because of a copy having been 
posted on the Internet. This is the case of interC$t. While this article reviews the status of such a 
posting as a printed publication under the "printed publication" section of 35 U.S.C. § 102, it does 
not reach the question of whether such a posting might be evidence of public use or knowledge and 
thereby defeat patentability under the "public use or knowledge" section of 35 U.S.C. § 102. This 
presents different issues of proof and raises other issues beyond the scope of this article. 
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IT. CONSTITUTIONAL BACKGROUND 
An inventor has two options for profiting from an invention: keep the 
invention confidential, thus relying on trade secret protection,17 or protect 
the invention under patent law.1s Thomas Jefferson, the father of the 
United States patent system,19 noted: 
If nature has made anyone thing less susceptible than all 
others of exclusive property, it is the action of the thinking 
power called an idea, which an individual may exclusively 
possess as long as he keeps it to himself; but the moment it is 
divulged, it forces itself into the possession of everyone .... 20 
The choice to share an invention with the public irrevocably surrenders the 
control which the inventor possessed. Thus, the Constitution instructs, an 
incentive must be provided to encourage inventors to share ideas with a 
world that would otherwise have, at best, the product of the invention for 
17. Trade secret protection arises under common law, but has been codified by statute based 
on the Uniform Trade Secrets Act (UTSA) in 34 states and the District of Columbia. See UNIF. 
TRADE SECRETS Acr, 14 U.L.A. 433 (1990). Certain misappropriations of trade secrets are also 
prohibited by federal criminal law, see 18 U.S.C. §§ 2314-2315, and the Economic Espionage Act 
of 1996, see 18 U .S.C. §§ 1831-1839. The general requirements for trade secret protection are the 
possession of confidential information which confers an economic benefit on those with knowledge 
of such information, plus reasonable steps to mai,ntain its confidentiality. See UNIF. TRADE SECRETS 
Acr § 1(4), 14 U.L.A. at 438. Trade secret protection prevents misappropriation-hroadly, 
obtaining the information by improper means. See id. § 1 (2). Trade secret protection may therefore 
be lost if the information becomes known to others through independent development or other 
proper means. Most states recognize reverse engineering of a publicly sold product as proper 
means. See, e.g., Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 476 (1974). Unless such an event 
occurs, however, a trade secret may be maintained indefinitely. 
18. In order to obtain a patent, the inventor must file an application with the United States 
Patent and Trademark Office (PTO). See 35 U.S.C. § 111 (1994). The application is examined by 
the PTO and, if the application meets statutory requirements (including the requirements of novelty 
under 35 U.S.C. § 102 and non-obviousness under 35 U.S.C. § 103), a patent is issued. See id. § 
131. The inventor has no patent rights until the patent is issued. See id. § 154(a)(2). Patent 
applications are, by law, confidential and, therefore, it is possible to maintain trade secret rights 
while a patent is pending. See id. § 122. Of course, once a patent issues, it is public and therefore 
information contained in the application can no longer be maintained as a trade secret. 
19. Jefferson is characterized in Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1,7 (1966), as the 
"moving spirit" of the patent statute and the author of the 1793 Act. 
20. THOMAS JEFFERSON, Letter to Isaac McPherson (Aug. 13, 1913), in THE PORTABLE 
THOMAS JEFFERSON 525, 530 (Merrill D. Peterson, ed. 1975). Jefferson further observed: "Its 
peculiar character, too, is that no one possesses the less, because every other possesses the whole 
of it. He who receives an idea from me, receives instructions himself without lessening mine; as he 
who lights his taper at mine receives light without darkening me." Id. This observation was clearly 
a lapse of economic judgment for the sake of rhetoric. The basis of trade secret law is that there is 
economic value in keeping competitors in the dark. 
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as long as the inventor chose to share it, and no 10nger.21 
The Constitution does not specify the incentive.22 It is clear, however, 
that no incentive is necessary if the public is already in possession of the 
underlying inventive idea. Hence section 102 denies patentability to ideas 
which were "public" (to choose a word that does not prejudge the issue) 
either before their supposed invention by the patent applicanf3 or 
sufficiently long before the applicant chose to apply for a patent.24 Most 
countries apply an absolute novelty standard which, except in limited 
circumstances, precludes patentability for an invention disclosed, even by 
the inventor, prior to fIling a patent application.2S United States law 
provides a grace period for an inventor to file a patent application after 
having made the invention public. 26 It was early held that minor deviations 
from public domain material would not support patentability.27 This 
judicial gloss was codified as 35 U.S.C. § 103 which denies patentability 
to ideas which are "obvious" advances over what is already "public.,,28 
Thus, the question of when an idea is already "public" is central to the 
issue of patentability. Congress has experimented with this fundamental 
issue. The following Part discusses the various attempts by Congress to 
answer this important question. 
21. Some inventions lend themselves more easily to commercialization coupled with trade 
secrecy than others. Inventions which may be used under the sole control of the inventor (for 
example a machine which produces, but is not itself, a consumer product) can be commercialized 
without disclosing their secrets. Inventions which must be placed in the hands of third parties (for 
example, consumer products) pose greater risks of disclosure, for example, by reverse engineering. 
22. In fact, Congress has from time to time altered the incentive, and has provided different 
incentives for different types of inventions and discoveries. Most recently, it changed the term of 
United States Patents from 17 years from date of issue to 20 years from date of application. See 35 
U.S.C. § 154(a)(2) (1998). Design patents last for 14 years. See 35 U.S.C. § 173 (1994). 
23. See 35 U.S.C. § 102(a) (1994). 
24. See id. § 102(b). Note that the two subclauses of section 102 have different purposes. 
Section 102(a) reinforces the section 101 principle that only the inventor is entitled to a patent: if 
there were a printed publication describing the invention before the claimed date of invention, then 
the applicant is not the original inventor. On the other hand, section 102(b) can bar even the 
original inventor from obtaining a patent The purpose of section 102(b) is to discourage inventors 
from delaying filing an application (thereby delaying, if not destroying, the public benefit of the 
disclosure of the invention) or from filing a patent application only after efforts to preserve a trade 
secret have failed. 
25. See DONAlD S. CHISUM & MICHAEL A. JACOBS, UNDERSTANDING INTEUECI'UAL 
PROPERTY LAW 2-97 (1997); DONAlD A. GREGORY ET AL., INTRODUCTION TO INTEUECI'UAL 
PROPERTY LAW 38-39 (1994). 
26. The grace period with respect to printed publications for public use or sale is currently 
one year. See 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) (1994). Under the 1836 statute, as amended in 1839, the grace 
period was two years. There is no grace period in countries which follow the rule of absolute 
novelty. 
27. See Hotchkiss v. Greenwood, 52 U.S. (11 How.) 248, 261 (1850). 
28. See 35 U.S.C. § 103 (1994). 
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Ill. STATUTORY DEVELOPMENT OF THE 
PuBLIC DOMAIN CONCEPT 
[Vol.Sl 
The patent statute divides the patentable from the unpatentable along 
several lines: inventorship, patentable subject matter, and prior state of the 
art. Only inventors may apply for patents.29 Only subject matter permitted 
by statute may be patented.30 Only inventions, knowledge of which is not 
already in the public domain, may be patented.3! 
Although the statute has been through several major incarnations, from 
the beginning it has prohibited granting patents which would withdraw 
technology from the public domain. However, the requirement that a patent 
be denied if the invention was described in a prior printed publication did 
not explicitly enter the patent statute until its third enactment, in 1836.32 
A. The 1790 Statute 
The original patent statute,33 enacted in 1790, provided for patenting of 
"any useful art, manufacture, engine, machine, or device, or any 
improvement therein not before known or used.,,34It also created a board 
29. See id. § 101. 
30. See id. 
31. See id. § 102. 
32. See infra text accompanying notes 41-47, 
33. Act of April 10, 1790, ch. 7,1 Stat. 109 (l790)(repealed 1793), Section 1 of the statute 
provided: 
That upon the petition of any person or persons to the Secretary of State, the 
Secretary for the department of war, and the Attorney General of the United 
States, setting forth, that he, she, or they, hath or have invented or discovered any 
useful art, manufacture, engine, machine, or device, or any improvement therein 
not before known or used, and praying that a patent may be granted therefor, it 
shall and may be lawful to and for the said Secretary of State, the Secretary for the 
department of war, and the Attorney General, or any two of them, if they shall 
deem the invention or discovery sufficiently useful and important, to cause letters 
patent to be made out in the name of the United States, to bear [tests] by the 
President of the United States, reciting the allegations and suggestions of the said 
petition, and describing the said invention or discovery, clearly, truly and fully, 
and thereupon granting to such petitioner or petitioners, his, her or their heirs, 
administrators or assigns for any term not exceeding fourteen years, the sole and 
exclusive right and liberty of making, constructing, using and vending to others 
to be used, the said invention or discovery, , , • 
Id. § 1,1 Stat. 109-10. 
34. ld. Presumably, the "not before known" standard would have precluded patenting an 
invention which would fail the current section 102(b) bar, although it is not clear what time frame 
the ''before'' refers to (the date of invention or the date of application). If it refers to the date of th~ 
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composed of the Secretary of State (then Thomas Jefferson), the Secretary 
of War (then Henry Knox), and the Attorney General (then Edmund 
Randolph), empowered to issue a patent "if they shall deem the invention 
or discovery sufficiently useful and important.,,35 No power of review was 
provided,36 and presumably these three cabinet members took time from 
their regular duties to review each application.37 
B. The 1793 Statute 
The second patent statute,38 enacted in 1793, provided that 
when any person ... being a citizen ... of the United States, 
shall allege that he ... [has] invented any new and useful art, 
machine, manufacture or composition of matter, or any new 
and useful improvement of any art, machine, manufacture or 
composition of matter, not known or used before the 
application, and shall present a petition to the Secretary of 
State, ... it shall and may be lawful for the said Secretary of 
State, to cause letters patent to be made out .... 39 
Thus, in effect, under the 1793 statute, a patent was granted to any U.S. 
citizen who paid the application fee. If multiple parties claimed the same 
invention, a' three person board was appointed (one member by the 
Secretary of State, and one member by each of the claimants) to decide 
entitlement to the patent.40 
C. The 1836 and 1870 Statutes 
Senator John Ruggles of Maine perceived the flaw of what was, in 
effect, a registration system (as opposed to an examination system) and 
chaired the Congressional committee which reviewed and revised the 
application, then it is a more stringent standard than that imposed by current section 1 02(b), but 
conforms to the norm of patent statutes outside the United States. See supra note 25. In that case, 
"by others" must be implied, since by definition the inventor knew of the invention before filing 
the application (although not before the date of invention). 
35. 1 Stat. at 110. 
36. Perhaps no review power was provided in despair of finding a tribunal willing to second-
guess Jefferson, Knox, and Randolph. 
37. In the three years of operation under the 1790 statute, 55 patents were issued. See U.S. 
DEP'T OF COMMERCE, THE STORY OF THE U.S. PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE 2 (1988). 
38. Act of Feb. 21,1793, ch. II, 1 Stat. 318 (repealed 1836). 
39. [d. § I, 1 Stat. at 318-20. The language limits patents to invention not known or used 
before filing of the application. This must have been intended to mean "not known or used by 
others" since clearly the inventor knew of the invention before filing the application. 
40. See id. § 9, 1 Stat. at 322-23. In the case of more than two claimants, either the parties 
mutually agreed on the arbitrators or the Secretary of State appointed all three. See id. 1 Stat. at 323. 
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patent statute in 1836. The Ruggles committee report noted that, under the 
1793 system, patents were issued "without any examination into the merit 
or novelty of the invention," "[many] patents ... are worthless and void, 
as conflicting with, and infringing upon one another, or upon, public rights 
not subject to patent privilege; arising either from a want of due attention 
to the specifications of claim, or from the ignorance of the patentees of the 
state of the arts ... ," and "a great number of lawsuits arise, which are 
daily increasing in an alarming degree, onerous to the courts, ruinous to the 
parties, and injurious to society," and concluded that patents, and thus the 
then-current patent system, were of little value.41 As a result of the Ruggles 
report, the third patent statute42 was enacted in 1836, returning to the pre-
1793 examination system, and imposing for the first time an explicit 
statutory bar to patentability in the case of prior "printed pUblications. ,,43 
The 1836 act provided: 
[I]f ... it shall not appear to the Commissioner that the same 
had been ... described in any printed publication in this or 
any foreign country, or had been in public use or on sale with 
the applicant's consent or allowance prior to the application, 
if the Commissioner shall deem it to be sufficiently useful and 
important, it shall be his duty to issue a patent therefor.44 
41. JOHN RUGGrns, SENATE REPORT ACCOMPANYING S. 239, 24TH CONGo at 3-4 (1st Sess. 
1836). 
42. Act of July 4, 1836, ch. 357, 5 Stat. 117 (1836) (amended 1870; repealed 1952). 
43. See id. § 7, 5 Stat. at 119-20. Interestingly, U.S. Patent #1 (the earlier patents not having 
been numbered) was issued to Senator Ruggles for a "Locomotive Steam-Engine for Rail and Other 
Roads." U.S. DEP'TOFCOMMERCE, supra note 37, at 7. Nothing in the patent statute bars the grant 
of a patent to a legislator. Then-Congressman Abraham Uncoln received U.S. Patent 6,469 for "A 
Device for Buoying Vessels over Shoals." Id. at 9. 
44. § 7,5 Stat. at 119-20 (emphasis added). The pertinent test reads: 
[I]f, [upon examination], it shall not appear to the Commissioner that the same 
had been invented or discovered by any other person in this country prior to the 
alleged invention or discovery thereof by the applicant, or that it had been 
patented or described in any printed publication in this or any foreign country, or 
had been in public use or on sale with the applicant's consent or allowance prior 
to the application, if the Commissioner shall deem it to be sufficiently useful and 
important, it shall be his duty to issue a patent therefor. But whenever, on such 
examination, it shall appear to the Commissioner that the applicant was not the 
original and first inventor or discoverer thereof, or that any part of that which is 
claimed as new had before been invented or discovered, or patented, or described 
in any printed publication in this or any foreign country, as aforesaid, or that the 
description is defective and insufficient, he shall notify the applicant thereof, 
giving him, briefly, such information and references as may be useful in judging 
of the propriety of renewing his application, or of altering his specification to 
embrace only that part of the invention or discovery which is new. 
1999) INrERSEC170N OF CYBERSPACEAND PATENT LA W 241 
Interestingly, the highlighted language was not present in the April 28 
Senate report, and there appears to be no legislative history indicating the 
reason for its inclusion or the manner in which it was introduced into the 
final bill approved on July 4, 1836. No corresponding change was added 
to the infringement defenses section,45 adding to the implication that 
Congress did not devote significant attention to the issue.46 
The 1836 statute also created a distinct Patent Office within the 
Department of State and provided for internal appellate review and appeal 
to the courtS.47 It was not until 1870 that the Patent Office began publishing 
patents.48 
D. The 1952 Statute 
The latest major revision of the patent statute occurred in 1952.49 It 
retained the bar to patentability of inventions previously described in a 
patent or printed publication5o and added a new statutory bar to 
patentability of inventions which were obvious in light of such 
publications.51 The relevant statutory language currently reads: 
[d. (emphasis added). 
45. Section 15 of the 1836 patent statute provided that a defendant could plead any special 
matter tending to prove that the invention "had been described in some public work anterior to the 
supposed discovery thereof by the patentee, or had been in public use, or on sale, with the consent 
and allowance of the patentee before his application for a patent" § 15,5 Stat. at 123. Under the 
1870 re-enactment of the patent statute, the "public work" language was replaced by a defense that 
the invention or discovery "had been patented or described in some printed publication prior to [the 
plaintiffs] supposed invention or discovery thereof." Act of July 8,1870, ch. 230, § 61, 16 Stat. 
198,208 (1870) (repealed 1952). 
46. The issue would be whether a defendant could raise the defense that the patent was 
invalid if it were anticipated by a printed publication which had not been identified by the patent 
office during prosecution. Had it been identified during prosecution, the patent office would have 
refused to issue the patent on the basis of the highlighted language. Thus, the patent should not have 
been issued. However, once the patent had issued. the statute does not explicitly permit the 
defendant to defeat an infringement suit based on a prior printed publication. This inconsistency 
was corrected in the 1870 statute, see § 61. 16 Stat. at 208 , and does not appear to have been raised 
in litigation in the interim. 
47. See § 7, 5 Stat. at 119-20 (internal review); § 16,5 Stat. at 123-24 Gudicial review}. 
Judicial appellate review was transferred, under the 1851 amendments, to the U.S. Court for the 
District of Columbia, to the U.S. Court of Customs and Patent Appeals in 1929, and then to the 
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit in 1982. 
48. See § 20, 16 Stat. at 200; U.S. DEP'TOFCOMMERCE, supra note 37, at 14. Previously one 
copy was retained by the patent office and one copy delivered to the inventor. 
49. See Patent Act, ch. 950, 66 Stat 792 (1952) (codified as amended at 35 U.S.C. §§ 1-293 
(1994}). 
50. See § 102,66 Stat. at 797-98. 
51. See id. (codifying the judicial interpretation first adopted by the Supreme Court in 
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Conditions for patentability; novelty and loss of right to 
patent 
A person shall be entitled to a patent unless-
(a) the invention was known or used by others in this 
country, or patented or described in a printed 
publication in this or a foreign country, before the 
invention thereof by the applicant for patent, or 
(b) the invention was patented or described in a 
printed publication in this or a foreign country or in 
public use or on sale in this country, more than one 
year prior to the date of the application for patent in 
the United States ... 52 
Conditions for patentability; non-obvious subject matter 
A patent may not be obtained though the invention is not 
identically disclosed or described as set forth in section 102 
of this title, if the differences between the subject matter 
sought to be patented and the prior art are such that the 
subject matter as a whole would have been obvious at the 
time the invention was made to a person having ordinary skill 
in the art to which said subject matter pertains. Patentability 
shall not be negatived by the manner in which the invention 
was made.53 
N. THE "PRINTED PuBUCATION" 
IsSUE IN THE CASES 
[VoL 51 
The meaning of "printed publication" is thus central to patentability.54 
The constitutionally mandated exchange of new knowledge for limited 
monopoly, implemented by the section 102 bar of patentability of claims 
already in the public domain, is determined most frequently by the 
evidence of "printed publications. ,,55 What, then, is a "printed pUblication," 
and how does it differ from a "publication" (or, for that matter, from a 
"printing")? Precisely that question has been raised in a number of cases, 
testing the 1836 formulation against then-modem technological advances. 
Two theories emerged as to its application: one emphasizing "printed," 
the other emphasizing "publication." Since the original statutory language 
predates even the typewriter (invented in 1867), and since the method of 
Hotchkiss v. Greenwood, 52 u.s. (11 How.) 248 (1850». 
52. 35 U.S.C. § 102(a), (b) (1994) (emphasis added). 
53. [d. § 103. 
54. For a general review see Kobylak, supra note 13. 
55. See PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, supra note 1, § 706.02 (''By far the most frequent 
ground of rejection is on the ground of unpatentability in view of the prior art ••.• n). 
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printing employed in 1836 has become commercially infeasible, both 
theories must employ some degree of speculation as to legislative purpose, 
without engaging in the statutory construction debate between strict 
construction and legislative intent analysis. The alternative would be to 
read section 102 out of the statute. 
A. The "Print" Theory of "Printed Publications" 
What may be called the "print" theory holds that the statute requires 
that a printed publication meet two tests: it must be published, and it must 
be produced by a mass printing process.56 A document that meets these 
tests is a "printed publication"-proof of actual public access to the 
document is not required.57 Under this theory, even though information 
56. See In re Tenney, 254 F.2d 619, 626 (C.C.P.A. 1958). 
57. See itl. at 626-27. The Tenney court noted that it is 
readily evident that what Congress was concerned with. both in 1836 and 1952, 
was the probability that the subject matter would be made known to the American 
public. Knowledge and use in the United States would probably (or so Congress 
must have reasoned) come to the attention of the American people whereas the 
same probability would not be present with respect to such knowledge and use 
abroad. By the same token, in the case of "printed" publications, Congress no 
doubt reasoned that one would not go to the trouble of printing a given description 
of a thing unless it was desired to print a number of copies of it. •.• 
But though the law has in mind the probability of public knowledge of the 
contents of the publication. the law does not go further and require that the 
probability must have become an actuality. In other words, once it has been 
established that the item has been both printed and published, it is not necessary 
to further show that any given number of people actually saw it or that any specific 
number of copies have been circulated. The law sets up a conclusive presumption 
to the effect that the public has knowledge of the publication when a single printed 
copy is proved to have been so published. 
Id. (footnote omitted). 
In In re Wyer, 655 F.2d 221 (C.C.P.A. 1981), a document was held to be a printed publication 
without any evidence that any member of the public actually had accessed it. See id. at 226-27. In 
another case, the court was willing to infer public access prior to the critical date based on 
ambiguous testimony as to the "normal" process of a university library. See In re Hall, 781 F.2d 
897, 899-900 (Fed. Cir. 1986) (holding a doctoral thesis to be a printed publication). The court in 
Ex parte Hershberger, 96 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 54, 56 (pat. Off. Bd. App. 1953), held that a single copy 
of a college thesis was a printed publication despite restrictions placed on copying. The court noted 
that access, rather than the ability to copy, determined "publication" status. See id. at 56-57. While 
clearly correct as stated (the right to copy. even in the case of a book, being controlled by copyright 
law), the statement overlooks the impact that the right to copy has on public access. In the case of 
a book, there is presumably a broad right of the public to own a copy, not by copying, but by virtue 
of the fact that publication makes multiple copies available for purchase. In the case of a single copy 
which is deemed published solely because it is indexed in a library, the presumption of public 
access inherently depends on interested parties being able to make their own copies. 
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might be a "publication," in the sense that it has been made available to the 
public, it still would not qualify as a section 102 reference if it were not 
"printed. ,,58 This theory is better understood in historical context. In a time 
before typewriters, photocopiers, telefaxes and high-speed printers (much 
less electronic mail and Web pages), the only means of permanent mass 
dissemination of information was the printing press. Thus, an 1836 
lawmaker trying to distinguish between "public" (meaning not trade secret) 
information, and information that was both public in that sense and public 
in the sense of being widely disseminated in a permanent form, could well 
have chosen the words "printed publication" to convey that concept. As 
explained in In re Tenney:S9 "Congress no doubt reasoned that one would 
not go to the trouble of printing ... unless it was desired to print a number 
of copies," therefore presumably increasing the likelihood of availability 
to the public.60 
B. The "Publication" Theory of "Printed Publications" 
What may be termed the "publication" theory adopts a broad 
interpretation of the term "printed," instead placing its focus on whether 
a document has been made widely available to the public. As early as 
1937, the Patent Office Board of Appeals recognized that the literal 1836 
meaning of "printed" was an unworkable standard, since printing at that 
time involved movable type, a process no longer in wide use in the 20th 
century printing industry.6l In 1960, a district court foreshadowed the 
58. This literal reading is supported by the "public use or knowledge" language of the same 
statutory sections. See 35 U.S.C. § 102. If the "printed publication" clause is considered to require 
public access independent of the means of publication, then presumably whatever is covered by the 
"printed publication" language would also be covered by the "public knowledge" clause. The 
implication of the use of the two clauses is that Congress perceived a difference between printed 
and non-printed information. One difference may be based on the assumption that printed 
documents can "travel" more easily and widely than people; thus, a printed document, wherever it 
originates, may be presumed to reach an interested audience in the United States. A second 
difference may be based on a concern that non-printed knowledge is more perishable than printed 
knowledge. This latter difference cannot explain the geographic distinction of the two bars: 35 
U.S.C. § 102 bars patentability if there has been a printed publication anywhere in the world, while 
it bars patentability based on prior public use knowledge in the United States. See supra text 
accompanying note 52 for the full language of the statutory section. 
59. 254 F.2d 619 (C.C.P.A. 1958). Although stating the "publication" view, the Tenney court 
concluded that the document sub judice, a microfilmed document, did not meet that standard for 
a printed publication. See id. at 622. 
60. Id. at 626. 
61. See Gulliksen v. Halberg, 75 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 252 (pat. Off. Bd. App. 1937). In Gulliksen 
the Board affirmed the dissolution of an interference (an internal procedure to determine priority 
between two applicants for patents on the same invention) on the grounds that neither applicant was 
entitled to the patent since it was anticipated by a printed publication. See id. at 254. The printed 
pUblication was a typewritten thesis, bound and shelved at the Massachusetts Institute of 
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"publication" theory when it interpreted "printed" as employing a method 
by which many copies could be easily and quickly reproduced from one 
standard article, so as to ensure general distribution and public disclosure.62 
Technology library. See id. at 253. It had been stipulated that the thesis was available to the public 
prior to the bar date and that its contents anticipated the claimed invention. See id. The only issue 
was whether the thesis was a "printed publication." See id. Although erroneously stating that the 
printed publication requirement entered the patent statute in 1870, see supra note 44, the Board 
stated: 
at that time [1870], a printed publication could be produced in only one way, i.e., 
pieces of individual type were set by hand and after an amount equivalent to a 
page had been composed, the type were locked in a frame, the face of the type 
treated with a coating of ink and the paper was then pressed on the type to produce 
an imprint It is, therefore, clear that at the time this term was placed in the patent 
statutes it necessarily had a restricted and specific meaning, but since that date, the 
art of printing has undergone many radical changes so that at the present day it 
would be almost impossible to have any printing done in accordance with the 
process in use in 1870. At the present time, practically all printed matter, including 
court records, which are required to be in print, are printed on what is known as 
a rotary press. In such a press, the printing face is made up not of movable type, 
but of a cast cylinder which impresses only a line at a time as the paper is passed 
beneath the roll. In addition, the term "printed" can be properly applied to a 
process in which a stenciled sheet prepared on a typewriter, is used. In this latter 
instance, no type is used in making the imprint, but according to the accepted 
definition of the term "printed," the product resulting from the use of a 
mimeographed sheet can properly be described as printed matter. It is therefore 
apparent to us that at the present time the term "printed" cannot be given a specific 
meaning. Instead, it is a general term defining an operation by which devices 
carrying shapes of letters, characters, etc., are caused to leave a reproduction of 
said letters, etc., impressed or fixed upon a sheet of paper or other material. 
[d. at 253. 
62. See Browning Mfg. Co. v. Bros, Inc., 126 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 499, 503 (D. Minn. 1960). 
The court held that summary judgment on anticipation (based on drawings which were exhibited 
at a trade show as part of a sales exhibition, but not distributed) was inappropriate given the factual 
issues presented, but in so doing discussed the printed publication issue. See id. at 505. 
The cases do not recognize any consistent definition and application of the term 
"printed publication" as used in the statute. Compare the typewritten college thesis 
cases, Hamilton Laboratories v. Massengill, 111 F.2d 584 (6th Cir. 1940); Ex 
parte Hershberger, 96 U.S.P.Q. 54 (p.O.B.A., 1952); Gulliksen v. Halberg, 75 
U.S.P.Q. 252 (p.O.B.A., 1937); with, Application of Tenney, 254 F.2d 619,117 
U.S.P.Q. 348 (C.C.P.A. Patents, 1958); Permutit Co. v. Graver Corp., 43 F.2d 
898,7 U.S.P.Q. 51 (7th Cir. 1930); Permutit Co. v. Wadham, 13 F.2d 454 (6th 
Cir. 1926); Carter Products, Inc. v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 130 F. Supp. 557, 104 
U.S.P.Q. 314 (D. Md. 1955), affirmed, 230 F.2d 855,108 U.S.P.Q. 383 (4th Cir. 
1956), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 843, 111 U.S.P.Q. 467 (1956). In Application of 
Tenney, supra, a microfilm copy of a German patent application placed in the 
Library of Congress in Washington, D.C., after World War II was held not to be 
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The theory is most clearly articulated in In re Wyer:63 a document is a 
printed publication "whether ... printed ... on microfilm or a magnetic 
disk or tape ... " if "available and accessible to persons concerned with the 
art.,,64 The theory has become firmly established (if not universally 
followed) in a series of cases reviewing the question whether a single copy 
of a typewritten thesis, properly indexed in a publicly accessible library, 
was a printed publication.6S Under the "publication" theory, what is central 
a printed pUblication in that the method of reproduction was not a "mode of 
producing copies which would ordinarily be used in making a large number of 
copies so as to insure general distribution of publication." ... This would seem 
to be the better rule for it is the ease of mass production that increases the 
probability that the invention will be disclosed to the public for commercial 
exploitation. The word "printed," as enacted in the statute, modifies ''publication''; 
they must be read together. Printing, though not necessarily requiring the use of 
a printing press, at least connotes a system of reproduction whereby many copies 
of a document may be easily and quickly reproduced from one standard article 
or set of symbols. Something more than public disclosure of any document is 
meant; it is the method or mode of making the disclosures which is also material. 
In the instant case, it does not appear how the drawings in question were 
produced. • • . For all that the record shows, the drawings could have been 
originals created through the use of manual drafting utensils or made by tracing[,] 
neither of which process is printing. 
Id. at 503 (emphasis added). The underscored language of the above formulation, of course, would 
now make any data fixed on paper a "printed publication" because photocopying permits the 
required easy and quick reproduction from a standard original. 
63. 655 F.2d 221 (C.C.P.A. 1981). The Wyer court upheld the denial of a patent in light of 
a microfilmed document, holding that such a document was a printed publication under 35 U.S.C. 
§ 102. See id. at 227. 
64. Id. 
65. See, e.g., In re Hall, 781 F.2d 897 (Fed. Cir. 1986); Hamilton Lab., Inc. v. Massengill, 
III F.2d 584 (6th Cir. 1940). In a questionable extension of the principle, the board in Gulliksen 
v. Halberg, 75 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 252, 253 (pat. Off. Bd. App. 1937), concluded that the document 
was available as an anticipatory reference as of the date of its receipt by the library, not the date it 
was indexed. This is contrary to the results reached in Canron, Inc. v. Plasser Am. Corp., 474 F. 
SUpp. 1010 (B.D. Va. 1978), affd, 609 F.2d 1075 (4th Cir. 1979); Bergstrom v. Sears, Roebuck & 
Co., 457 F. Supp. 213 (D. Minn. 1978), affd, 599 F.2d 62 (8th Cir. 1979); and Protein Found., Inc. 
v. Brenner, 260 F. SUpp. 519 (D.D.C. 1966); and the position stated by the Patent Office in the 
MANUAL OF PATENT ExAMlNING PROCEDURE, see PATENT&TRADEMARKOmCE, supra note 1, at 
700-11; all of which hold that the effective date of a magazine is the date it reached an addressee, 
not the date it was placed in the mail. Presumably, there is data on the reliability of mail delivery 
which would permit a presumption that at least some magazine subscribers receive their magazines 
in a timely fashion. It is doubtful that similar data on the indexing of material by libraries in general 
exists. Thus, if magazines become anticipatory references upon receipt rather than mailing, it would 
seem that, a fortiori, a document which is an anticipatory reference solely by virtue ofits availability 
in a library should become so as of the date of indexing, rather than the date of receipt by the 
library. In re Bayer, 568 F.2d 1357, 1362 (C.C.P.A. 1978), implicitly holds that the date of 
indexing controls as the date of anticipation in cases where the document is a printed publication 
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to the monopoly-for-information exchange is that the information be 
placed widely and irretrievably in the hands of the public, and the 1836 
Congress used the words "printed publication" in the context of printing 
being the only reliable means of doing so. 
While the "publication" theory tends to find anticipation and therefore 
deny patentability in more cases than does the "print" theory, it should be 
noted that the theories cannot be classified simply as "pro patentee" or 
"anti-patentee." Even accepting the "publication" theory that printinRis the 
only reliable means of assuring public access, the reverse is not necessarily 
true. There are situations in which a document might be printed (in the 
classical printing press sense) and published (in the classical multiple-
copies-available for distribution sense), and therefore a "printed 
publication" under the "printed" theory, yet not be a "printed publication" 
under the "publication" theory if it could be shown that the public did not 
in fact have access to the document. Such a case was presented in 
Badowski v. United States,66 where a document published by the 
government of the U.S.S.R. was held not to satisfy the "printed 
publication" requirement because, although "printed" and "published," it 
was difficult to obtain (and, presumably, not "public,,).67 The Court held 
by virtue of library deposit. Accord Ecolochem, Inc. v. Southern Cal. Edison Co., 863 F. Supp. 
1165,1174 (C.D. Cal. 1994), modified, 91 F.3d 169 (Fed. Cir. 1996). The touchstone is not the 
typewriter, but the placement of the document in a publicly accessible location coupled with means 
for the public to know of the document's existence. Cf.ln re Cronyn, 890 F.2d 1158. 1161 (Fed. 
Cir. 1989) (holding that a typewritten thesis, indexed in a shoebox in the library of a chemistry lab 
and only by the student's name, was not a printed publication). 
66. 164 F. Supp. 252 (Ct. Cl. 1958). 
67. See itl. at 256. Badowski involved parachute technology, which was described in a Soviet 
Air Force journal. See id. The U.S. government had tried unsuccessfully to obtain a copy of the 
journal, finally doing so only after years of effort. See itl. It should also be noted that, although not 
referred to in the decision, the case arose at the height of the Cold War, during a time when U.S.-
U.S.S.R. competition for scientific "firsts" gave rise to suspicion as to the authenticity. as well as 
accessibility, of Soviet documents and the facts reported in them. See, e.g., Freeman v. Minnesota 
Mining & Mfg., Co., 693 F. Supp. 134,149 (D. Del. 1988), afJ'd in part and vacated in part, 884 
F.2d 1397 (Fed. Cir. 1989) (relying on the testimony of an expert witness that, in the 1970s, Soviet 
research institutes were not open to foreigners and that visas were not reliably available). 
Inaccessible documents (e.g., classified documents) cannot serve as references since they do not 
put the information in question in the public domain. Classified documents have been held 
unavailable as references. See Whitcomb v. American Airlines Inc., 164 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 610 (B.D. 
Va. 1968), rev'd on other grounds, 443 F.2d 630 (4th Cir. 1971); see also Wycoffv. Motorola, 
Inc., 502 F. Supp. 77, 88 (N.D. Ill. 1980) (holding that a manual sold to the government prior to 
the critical date "did not, as is required, place the claimed subject matter in the possession of the 
public, since the publication remained secret within the U.S. government's hands only," and 
rejecting the argument that distribution to the government was sufficient to constitute publication). 
"The decided cases clearly indicate that distribution of printed documents by an independent 
contractor to the customer or contracting party in connection with the contract work does not, in 
and of itself, constitute a 'publication' of the documents." Id. at 88 (citing Dow Chern. Co. v. 
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that "[t]he statutory language, 'printed publication,' implies that numerous 
copies were printed and were made accessible to the general public.,,68 
It is impossible to determine by purely grammatical analysis which 
interpretation the legislature intended: Were they trying to subdivide what 
was "printed" in the sense of being permanently recorded on paper (which 
would include, for example, private letters) into that which was private and 
that which was publicly accessible, or were they trying to subdivide what 
was publicly accessible (in the sense of not being a trade secret) into that 
which had been mass produced and that which had not? Accepting the 
1836 premise that the only way to assure permanent public accessibility 
was via the printing press (and remembering that even the invention of the 
typewriter was still more than thirty years in the future when the 1836 
statute was enacted), the two interpretations were indistinguishable. Once 
the 1836 premise failed, the choice of theory mattered.69 With the 
introduction of microfllm and the photocopier, technologies which did not 
Williams Bros. Well Treating Corp., 81 F.2d 495,499 (10th Cir. 1936»; cf. Siemens-Blema AB 
v. Puritan-Bennett Corp. 13 U.S.P.Q. 2d (BNA) 1804, 1806 (S.D. Cal. 1989) (holding "[t]he 
difficulty in locating ... documents does not diminish the public's right of access once they are 
found"). 
The Patent Office's MANUAL OF PATENT BXAMINING PROCEDURE provides: 
Bffective Dates of Declassified Printed Matter 
In using declassified material as references there are usually two pertinent 
dates to be considered, namely, the printing date and the publication date. The 
printing date .•. may be considered as that date when the material was prepared 
for limited distribution. The publication date is the date of release when the 
material was made available to the public .... 
In the use of any of the above noted material as an anticipatory publication, 
the date of release following declassification is the effective date of publication 
within the meaning of the statute. 
For the purpose of anticipation predicated upon prior knowledge under 35 
U.S.C. § 102(a) the above noted declassified material may be taken as primajacie 
evidence of such prior knowledge as of its printing date even though such material 
was classified at that time. When so used the material does not constitute an 
absolute statutory bar and its printing date may be antedated by an affidavit under 
37 CFR 1.131. ••• 
PATENT & TRADEMARK OmCE, supra note I, at § 707.05(f). 
68. Badowski, 164 F. Supp. at 255. 
69. Many cases could still, of course, be resolved consistently under either theory. For 
example, the court in In re Cronyn, 890 F.2d at 1161, held that a thesis indexed in a college library 
by author's name only is not a printed publication. In In re Bayer, 568 F.2d 1357, 1361 (C.C.P.A. 
1978), the court held that a thesis available only to three reviewers was not a printed pUblication 
(because the probability of public knowledge of the contents of the document was virtually nil). 
Viewed from a "print" standpoint. both references fail because they were typed, not printed. Viewed 
from a "publication" standpoint. both fail because there was no way for the public to know of their 
existence or find them without knowing of their existence. 
1999) INTERSECTION OF CYBERSPACEAND PATENT LAW 249 
employ the movable type print of 1836, but which nevertheless permitted 
wide public dissemination, the premise no longer held. 
v. PRE-INTERNET DEVELOPMENT AND REsOLUTION 
When Congress amended the patent statute in 1836 to add the "printed 
publication" bar, mass distribution required printing on a press. As new 
technologies for mass publication emerged, courts wrestled with the 
boundaries of the definition of the word "printed." 
A The Printing Press 
Early cases rejected the argument that any document, simply by virtue 
of being on paper, was a printed publication, generally on the theory that 
public access was not achieved simply by placing an idea on paper.70 
Alternative copying technology consisted of manually rewriting a copy 
from an original, which was both time-consuming and posed the risk of 
errors in the process. 
B. Technology Breaks Through: The Typewriter 
The first deviation from accep'tance of the printing press definition of 
"printed" appears to be Gulliksen v. Halberg,?1 where the Patent Office 
Board of Appeals ruled that a typewritten thesis, available at only one 
library, was a printed publication. Although only one copy of the document 
was proved to exist, and that copy was typewritten rather than printed on 
a press, the board noted that it was a permanent, legible document, capable 
of wide distribution (by photographic means) and accessible to the public, 
and concluded that this satisfied the statutory requirement of a printed 
publication.72 Gulliksen was followed in 1940 by Hamilton Laboratories 
v. Massengill,73 the first appellate decision granting "printed publication" 
70. See, e.g., Keene v. Wheatley, 14 F. Cas. 180, 192-93 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1861) (No. 7644). 
Although a copyright infringement case, the court noted: ''Under the laws concerning patents for 
inventions, a previous description of the alleged invention in a 'public work,' which means a 
printed book, defeats a patent But such a description in an unprinted book has, in itself, no such 
effect." Id. at 193. "Human means of increasing the number of copies by writing are extremely 
limited. By printing, they may, on the contrary, in the words of Lord Cranworth, be multiplied 
indefinitely." Id. at 192. 
71. 75 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 252 (pat. Off. Bd. App. 1937). According to the dissent, "[t]he word 
'printed' used in the statute has not received any extended discussion in the decisions dealing with 
printed publications so thatit can be definitely ascertained what is comprehended within this word." 
Id. at 254 (Edinburg, Exam'r in Chief, dissenting). 
72. See id. at 253. Under this test, of course, any document becomes a printed publication 
since it can be photocopied. Such a view compels the focus to shift from "printing" to "making 
publicly accessible." 
73. III F.2d 584 (6th Cir. 1940). 
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status to a typewritten document. Again, this involved a thesis available in 
a single college library, although available to students and patrons of other 
libraries with exchange privileges.?4 
The Patent Office Board of Appeals extended the definition by 
including a typed document with handwritten elements as a printed 
publication, in Ex parte Hershberger.?S The typed document was a thesis, 
which included handwritten drawings and equations (the typewriter not 
having the requisite symbols for typing equations).?6 The liberalization of 
the definition of "printed publication" can, perhaps, be explained by the 
perception that public access to university library materials had (whether 
through improvements in indexing, transportation, or dissemination) 
reached the level of public access to 1836 printing press produced 
documents.?? 
Implicit abandonment of the literal printing requirement and 
development of the general "publication" view can be seen in 1. C.E. Corp. 
v. Armco Steel Corp.?8 The court in I.C.E. held that a reference may be a 
printed publication if the document "has been disseminated or otherwise 
made available to the extent that persons interested and ordinarily skilled 
in the subject matter or art, exercising reasonable diligence, can locate it 
and recognize and comprehend ... the essentials of the claimed invention 
without need of further research or experimentation.'t79 In 1967, a 
typewritten paper distributed at a conference was held to be a printed 
publication, a supportable reading of the statute only if publication is 
deemed to mean made available in a public or non-confidential manner.80 
By 1971, the Third Circuit explicitly concluded: '''[P]rinting' is no 
longer the only process synonymous with 'publication.' The emphasis, 
therefore, should be public dissemination . . . and its availability and 
74. See id. at 585. 
75. 96 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 54 (pat. Off. Bd. App. 1953). The Board noted that modem inks had 
become more permanent in character. See id. at 57. 
76. See id. at 55. A hand printed paper in the Japanese language was held to be a printed 
publication in Tyler Refrigeration Corp. v. Kysor Indus. Corp., 601 F. Supp. 590, 603-04 (D. Del.), 
ajJ'd, 777 F.2d 687 (Fed. Cir. 1985) on the basis that Japanese language documents were 
characteristically handwritten due to the large number of pictorial characters. 
77. Most United States doctoral dissertations and a large number of masters theses are now 
indexed, and publicly available, through University Microfilms International Dissertation Services, 
which provides "xerographic" copies from microfilm. 
78. 250 F. Supp. 738 (S.D.N.Y. 1966). 
79. Id. at 743. 
80. See Deep Welding, Inc. v. Sciaky Bros., Inc., 417 F.2d 1227, 1235 (7th Cir. 1969). Note 
that in the library indexing cases, at least the assumption can be made that ''the public" (i.e., anyone 
with sufficient interest and training in the particular subject matter) should be able to gain access 
to the document. In Deep Welding, however, it is difficult to see how such an assumption can be 
made without further factual support (for example, that the conference was attended by people who 
would in tum index the manuscript and make it available to ''the public"). 
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accessibility to persons skilled in the subject matter or art.,,81 In a 1974 
decision, however, the Seventh Circuit maintained the ambiguous word 
"printed" in concluding that: "[t]o constitute a printed publication ... all 
that is required is that the document in question be printed and so 
disseminated as to provide wide public access to it.,,82 
C. The Expansion Solidifies: The Mimeograph 
While caselaw on typewritten documents evolved along with 
technological advances making dissemination of such documents easier, 
and while microfilm technology is still in transition,83 the qualification of 
mimeograph documents as references appears to have been established 
without dissent. There appears to be no case holding that a mimeograph 
was not a printed publication. As early as 1937, the patent office rejected 
a patent based on the availability of a prior mimeographed document.84 The 
explanation, although not explicit in the cases, seems obvious. While a 
document might be microfilmed for one of two purposes (a means of 
dissemination or a means of archiving, often accompanied by the 
destruction or off-site storage of the original), the only reason for preparing 
a mimeograph stencil is so that multiple copies can be made, therefore 
presumably indicating an unambiguous intent to distribute and justifying 
a presumption that publication was intended. As with typ~set documents, 
if that presumption is rebutted (by showing that the document was 
classified or deemed confidential), then the document is not a printed 
81. Philips Elec. & Pharm. Indus. Corp. v. Thermal & Elec. Indus., Inc., 450 F.2d 1164, 1170 
(3rd Cir. 1971); accord Johns Hopkins Univ. v. CeIIPro, 894 F. SUpp. 819 (D. Del. 1995). The 
Philips court stated, however, that the party offering the document should prove that it had been 
disseminated or otherwise made accessible to persons concerned with the art to which the document 
related. See Philips, 450 F.2d at 1171. 
82. Popeil Bros., Inc. v. Schick Elec., Inc., 494 F.2d 162, 166 (7th Cir. 1974). The Popeil 
court invalidated a patent based on instruction books and advertising pamphlets distributed in 
Japan. See id. at 167. Of course, the literal holding is uninformative, since the document in question 
was "printed." 
83. See infra notes 86-95 and aCcompanying text. 
84. See Gulliksen v. Halberg, 75 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 252, 254 (pat. Off. Bd. App. 1937). The 
Board later accepted a handwritten document as a printed publication in Ex parte Brendlein, 105 
U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 453, 454 (pat. Off. Bd. App. 1955), stating that the printed publication 
requirement was satisfied where unlimited copies could be made. In Brendlein, the underlying 
document was listed in a widely circulated (printed) bibliography, along with instructions for 
ordering a copy produced from a microfilm master of the original paper copy. However, the court 
was unclear as to whether the printed publication was the original paper copy or the microfilm 
master. See id. A district court held a mimeograph document not to be a printed publication in 
General Tire & Rubber Co. v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., but did so on the basis that the 
document was confidential. See 349 F. SUpp. 345, 355 (N.D. Ohio 1972). Confidential documents 
do not constitute printed pUblications, even if they are produced using a printing press. See supra 
note 67. 
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publication.8s 
D. Technological No-Man's Land: Microfilm 
The third technological development to bring a new form of pUblication 
under § 102 was microfIlm. Here, however, the caselaw remains unsettled 
on fundamental issues. 
In In re Tenney,86 the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals was 
presented with the question whether a microfIlmed document was a printed 
publication. The court concluded it was not, reasoning: 
While microfIlming furnishes a means of mUltiplying copies, 
there is no probability, from a mere showing that a microfIlm 
copy of a disclosure has been produced, that the disclosure 
has achieved wide circulation and that, therefore, the public 
has knowledge of it. The nature of present day microfIlm 
reproduction differs from normal printing methods. Though 
one would be more likely than not to produce a number of 
copies of printed material, one producing an item by 
microfIlming would be as apt to make one copy as many. In 
the case of printing, unless a number of copies were produced, 
a waste of time, labor and materials would result; present day 
microfIlming methods, on the other hand, are as well designed 
to produce one microfIlm as well as many without waste.87 
The court was, however, troubled by its conclusion, noting: 
It is no doubt true that the present law is anomalous, as 
evidenced by our conclusion that the microfIlm is not 
"printed." A foreign patent fIle, laid open for public 
inspection, is not a printed publication, because typewritten, 
85. See General Tire, 349 F. Supp. at 354. The General Tire court discussed whether a class 
of documents was intended for distribution: 
The third classification of disputed references is the preliminary and final 
mimeographed reports of the Wilmington Chemical Company. At least one of 
these reports was distributed to several individuals in the rubber industry. 
However, each was marked "Confidential." There is no evidence that 
dissemination to the general public was intended, nor that the public had access 
to the reports. 
These reports fail as prior printed publications. They are not prior art under 
35 U.S.C. § 102. 
Id. at 355 (citations omitted). 
86. 254 F.2d 619, 621 (C.C.P.A. 1958). 
87. Id. at 627. 
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while a printed publication, available to the public only in a 
Southern Rhodesian library, would be. The former is 
obviously more likely to reach the eyes of the American 
public than the latter. It is obvious, however, that unless we 
are to rewrite 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) for Congress, this must be 
the result reached. Our job is to interpret the law, not to make 
it.88 . 
253 
While the court was properly concerned about a policy concluding that 
typewritten public documents were not "printed," while printed but less 
publicly accessible documents were not, the concern does not seem to 
follow from the court's premises. If in fact printing implies the intention 
to produce a large number of copies, while microfIlming does not, then the 
conclusion that a printed document would be available "only in a Southern 
Rhodesian library" seems faulty.89 Implicitly, the court must have been 
questioning the premises: by 1958, it was reasonable to question whether 
the underlying assumption that printing implied the intention to produce 
a large number of copies while microfIlming necessarily meant an 
intention to maintain close control over a limited number of copies was 
sound. 
In 1962, the Patent Office Board of Appeals interpreted Tenney's 
holding as limited to microfIlm that was indexed improperly, and 
distinguished the pending appeal on the basis that the reference in dispute 
had been indexed properly.90 Although following Tenney (and reaching the 
same conclusion), the district court in General Tire & Rubber Co. v. 
Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. ,91 was more precise in its focus on the reason 
for denying printed publication status to microfIlms of war-era German 
patents, maintained post-war by the u.S. government: 
Not only are Firestone's microfilm references not 
"printed," but there is no evidence of their publication. 
Publication is not shown by mere evidence of ability to mass 
produce. Directly in point are decisions which hold that 
German GM's (Gebrauchsmustern) are not publications 
although they are indexed, the index is published, and copies 
of the GM are available to the public on request. 
The German microfIlms fail as prior printed publications. 
88. Id. 
89. Id. 
90. Ex parte Garbo, 803 Off. Gaz. Pat. Office 315 (pat. Off. Bd. App. 1962). The Board also 
noted, "In the four years since [Tenney] microfilm techniques have made significant advances in 
the field of scientific information." Id. at 318. 
91. 349 F. Supp. 345 (N.D. Ohio 1972). 
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They are not prior art under 35 U.S.C. § 102.92 
The subtle shift between Tenney and General Tire is the recognition of 
the possibility that a microfilmed document might be a printed pUblication 
if there were evidence of publication93-presumably, of wide public 
availability.94 Although not discussed in General Tire, the distinction 
between properly and improperly indexed documents would logically be 
one factor in determining public availability.95 
E. The Envelope: Printed Publications "Written" on the Wind 
In Gulliksen, the Patent Office Board of Appeals noted that the 18th 
century method of printing was no longer commercially feasible and 
looked for the purpose of the printed pUblication requirement, concluding: 
[I]t is reasonable to infer that the framers of Section 4886 [the 
predecessor of 35 § U.S.C. 102] intended by "a printed 
publication" to mean a pUblication in which the text is fixed 
or impressed on pages in contradiction to pUblication by such 
fugitive means as lectures, gestures, etc. At the time this 
statute was written, the only way in which a permanent record 
could be made was either printing by means of type, or by 
writing out same in longhand by means of a pencil or pen. 
Longhand records were often difficult to decipher by reason 
92. [d. at 355 (citations omitted). 
93. Perhaps in an effort to insure against a remand of a case which had taken 20 years to bring 
to trial, generating a 44,773 page transcript and over 100,000 pages of depositions and evidence, 
see General Tire, 349 F. Supp. at 349 n.1, the court made this backup argument in Finding 127: 
Since reproduction by microfilm is not "printing," these German references fail 
as printed publications. Even if one were to consider them as being printed, they 
fail as anticipations because the microfilmed material itself was not publicly 
distributed. Instead, a list of the titles of the microfilmed material was published 
as the Bibliography of Scientific and Industrial Reports (BSIR). The material was 
so poorly indexed, however, that it was virtually inaccessible to a researcher. 
Further, many frames of microfilm are poorly made and difficult to reproduce or 
read accurately. 
[d. at 386-87. 
94. Several courts have now held that microfilm qualifies as printed, and that microfilm may 
be a printed pUblication ifithas been made public. See In re Wyer, 655 F.2d 221 (C.C.P.A. 1981); 
Philips Elec. & Pharm. Indus. Corp. v. Thermal & Elec. Indus., Inc., 450 F.2d 1164 (3rd Cir. 1971); 
Ex parte Brendlein, 105 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 453 (pat. Off. Bd. App. 1955); I.C.E. Corp. v. Armco 
Steel Corp., 250 F. Supp. 738 (S.D.N.Y. 1966). But see General Tire, 349 F. Supp. at 355. The 
result in General Tire may be reconciled since the court found no evidence of actual dissemination 
of the underlying document. See id. 
95. See Garbo, 803 Off. Gaz. Pat. Office at 318 
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of eccentricities in penmanship, and often the ink used was of 
poor quality. Obviously, printing produced a far more 
satisfactory record and would result in a wider distribution of 
the knowledge contained therein.96 
255 
Of course, as noted in Tenney,97 there are numerous handwritten 
documents that are centuries old. 
Although the circuit courts are split on the issue, there are cases holding 
that a verbal presentation, accompanied by display of a document, 
constitutes a printed publication. In Regents of University of California v. 
Howmedica, Inc. ,98 the court held that a lecture accompanied by slides did 
not create a printed publication, although noting that slides (had they been 
distributed) could themselves be a printed publication.99 Browning 
Manufacturing v. Bros, Inc. 1OO is in accord, holding that displaying a 
printed document at a trade show was insufficient to make the document 
a printed publication. lOl The Federal Circuit has gone both ways on the 
issue, and has failed to provide a clear test for the status of a verbal 
presentation accompanied by the display of printed materials.102 
The emphasis on public dissemination can be questioned as rendering 
the printed publication provision surplus in light of the "known or used by 
others" provision of section 102.103 If a printed publication is defined by its 
accessibility to, and knowledge by, others in the United States, then what 
does the printed publication bar add to the public knowledge bar? If it is 
interpreted as adding nothing, then the interpretation violates the canon of 
statutory construction that "courts should not interpret statutes in a manner 
that renders terms of the statute superfluous."I04 
It is clear, however, that modem cases have stepped away from a literal 
reading of the printing press requirement and instead have admitted any 
form of pUblication which appears to assure public access to the document 
96. Gulliksen v. Halberg, 75 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 252, 253 (pat Off. Bd. App. 1937). 
97. See supra note 59. 
98. 530 F. Supp. 846 (D.N.J. 1981), ajJ'd without opinion, 676 F.2d 687 (3rd Cir. 1982). 
99. See id. at 859-60. 
100. 126 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 499 (D. Minn. 1960). 
101. See id. at 503. 
102. Compare Massachusetts Inst of Tech. v. AB Fortia, 774 F.2d 1104, 1109 (Fed. Cir. 
1985) (holding that lhere was a printed publication under those circumstances), with Hybritech Inc. 
v. Abbott Lab., 849 F.2d 1446 (Fed. Cir. 1988), ajJ'g, 4 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1001, 1006-07 (C.D. 
Cal. 1987) (holding that lhere was no printed publication where only a limited number of printed 
copies of a speech had been provided, on a restricted basis, to a journal review committee). 
103. 35 U.S.C. § 102(a) (1994). 
104. George Hyman Constr. Co. v. Occupational Safety & Heallh Review Comm'n, 582 F.2d 
834,841 (4lh Cir. 1978); see also Virginia v. Browner, 80 F.3d 869, 877 (4lh Cir. 1996) ("A court 
should not .•. construe a statute in a manner that reduces some of its terms to mere surplusage."). 
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in question. 105 Although the statements of rationale vary, the following 
principles of modem interpretation emerge from the cases. A publication 
is not printed simply because it is on paper. For example, handwritten 
notes or private letters, not filed in a public place, do not satisfy the 
requirement.106 Conversely, a publication need not be reproduced by a 
printing press in order to be considered printed, if it is accessible to a 
significant portion of the public which might find it of interest (not, it 
should be noted, the entire public at large ).107 
While these might seem trivial interpretations of the statutory language, 
they are at least interpretations. A strict, frozen at the time of passage, 
interpretation of section 102 has been rejected, even though the statute has 
been recodified twice since 1836 and the "printed publication" language 
has survived legislative review intact. lOS Thus, it is possible to raise the 
question of how to apply the underlying principle of section 102 to 
emerging methods of communicating ideas. 
If the underlying purpose of section 102 is to assure public 
dissemination, then it is appropriate to view the cases as linked to the state 
of technology at their date of decision. Thus, a holding that a microfilmed 
105. Thus far, no court has extended the definition of "printed" to information which is not 
transmitted in a tangible form. Even the lecture cases, see supra notes 98-102 and accompanying 
text, involved the display, if not the transfer of possession, of tangible documents. 
106. The leading treatise of the 19th Century, 1 WIWAM C. ROBINSON, THE LAw OFPATENTS 
FOR USEFUL INVENTIONS 446-47 (Sage Hill Publishers, Inc. 1971) (1890) (footnotes omitted) 
comments as follows: 
[Tlhe publication must be: (1) A work of public character, intended for general 
use .••• 
A work of public character is such a book or other printed document as is 
intended and employed for the communication of ideas to persons in general, as 
distinguished from particular individuals. Private communications, although 
printed, do not come under this description, whether designed for the use of single 
persons or of a few restricted groups of persons. 
One writer has, however, proposed that the test should be "if any person other than the inventor 
has possession of a non-restricted ••. disclosure of the invention, then that particular disclosure 
must be considered a printed publication." Richard W. Hoffman, Comment, What Constitutes a 
Printed Publication Under the Patent Act, 1988 DET. C.L. REv. 961,972. While this proposal would 
provide a bright line test, it would make collaborations and venture financing virtually impossible. 
Many collaborators and venture capital firms will not agree to confidentiality, and it is difficult to 
monitor even formal publications in a business or academic environment; setting and enforcing policies 
for all disclosures would be impractical. Finally, any gain in clarity of statement would likely be at 
the expense of complication of evidentiary issues. 
107. See In re Cronyn, 890 F.2d 1158 (Fed. Cir. 1989); In re Wyer, 655 F.2d 221 (C.C.P.A. 
1981); Hamilton Lab., Inc. v. Massengill, 111 F.2d 584 (6th Cir. 1940): accord In re Bayer, 568 
F.2d 1357 (C.C.P.A. 1978) (stating the principle although holding it not satisfied in the case sub 
judice). 
108. See supra notes 41-53 and accompanying text 
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document is not a "publication" should, although stated in absolute terms, 
be viewed as a holding that a microfIlmed document is not a "publication" 
under the then-current state of microfIlm technology. 100 Therefore, whether 
the Internet is a printed publication medium or not depends on the then-
current state of Internet technology. As the typewriter cases show,uo 
changes in the underlying technology, or changes in public acceptance and 
use of the technology, can produce changes in the legal result. 
VI. THE INTERNET 
As new methods of disseminating information have become available, 
the definition of "printed publication" has expanded by extending the reach 
of "printed" to include documents which are not typeset. If the caselaw 
could expand the meaning of "printed" to include documents which are not 
typeset, could it not also expand to include information which is not a 
tangible document? 
The Manual of Patent Examining Procedure,111 containing the patent 
office's internal guidelines for review of patent applications, neither directs 
nor forbids patent examiners to make use of Internet resources as 
references. It has been suggested by one commentator that data stored in 
computers are likely to be considered printed publications.112 This 
suggestion appears to have contemplated that the information would be 
stored on a publicly accessible computer from which members of the 
public could retrieve copies.ll3 In that context, and assuming that the 
documents on the computer were properly indexed so as to allow 
identification of relevant information by members of the public interested 
in the art, this conclusion appears consistent with the trend of reasoning in 
modem cases.114 
109. Such a view is implicit in the recognition of advances in microfilm technology which at 
least partly underpins Ex parte Garbo, 803 Off. Gaz. Pat. Office 315,318 (pat. Off. Bd. App. 1962), 
justifying a decision at variance with the prior Board decision in Tenney. See supra note 59. 
110. See supra notes 71-82 and accompanying text. 
111. PATENf&TRADEMARKOFFICE,Supranote 1. 
112. See Kobylak, supra note 13, at 812 (acknowledging, however, that no court had yet 
addressed the issue). 
113. See id. at 813. "[C]ounsel may therefore expect the court' s inquiry to focus on the number 
of computer terminals having access to the computer' s data storage as well as the number of persons 
serviced by those terminals." ld. An example of a publicly accessible database would be LEXIS. 
Note that such a database does not pose the issues raised herein in connection with Internet 
publications: it is under the control of a disinterested third party, it is maintained permanently, the 
date of accession is established and maintained by a disinterested third party, and it is searchable. 
Should such a database be maintained on the Internet, as LEXIS is, it would not lose its status as 
a printed publication; however, it does not follow that merely placing data on the Internet per se 
creates a printed publication. See supra note 16. 
114. It should be noted that the revisers of the Uniform Commercial Code, although 
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The argument in favor of printed publication status for Internet 
publications can be summarized as follows. Philips Electronic & 
Pharmaceutical Industries Corp. v. Thermal & Electronics Industries, 
Inc. 1lS acknowledges that the patent statute is not "bound solely to the 
traditional method of the printing press" but must take into account 
contemporary technology. 116 Philips and In re Wyerll7 hold that the critical 
elements are the degree of dissemination and accessibilityY8 Wyer even 
states, in dictum, that magnetic storage can qualify as a printed 
publication.1l9 Modem computer technology has provided a low cost and 
ease of access which satisfies the requirement of the possibility of easy and 
quick reproduction under Browning Manujacturing. l2o The fundamental 
patent tradeoff is limited term monopoly in exchange for information 
otherwise unavailable to the public. What could be more public than 
something posted on the Internet? 
However appealing this argument is in its simplicity, it must pass two 
tests. It must show that an Internet posting meets the explicit holdings of 
the caselaw, and it must show that there are no implicit, underlying 
assumptions in the caselaw that would not apply equally with respect to 
Internet postings. Failing either test, the argument must be rejected and 
Internet postings cannot bar patentability under section 102(a).l2l 
A. Do Internet Postings Meet the Holdings 
oj Current Caselaw? 
It is easy to dispose of one hurdle to acceptance of Internet postings as 
printed pUblications: as posted, Internet documents are not printed in any 
sense of the word. They can be transferred to paper, but as posted, they are 
acknowledging the pressure of electronic commerce, concluded: 
The definition of "document" contemplates and facilitates the growing recognition 
of electronic and other nonpaper media as "documents," however, for the time 
being, data in those media constitute documents only in certain circumstances .••. 
The fact that data transmitted in a nonpaper (unwritten) medium can be recorded 
on paper by a recipient's computer printer, facsimile machine, or the like does not 
under current practice render the data so transmitted a "document." 
U.C.C. § 5-102, cmt. 2 (1995). 
115. 450 F.2d 1164 (3rd Cir. 1971). 
116. See id. at 1170. 
117. 655 F.2d 221 (C.C.P.A. 1981). 
118. See id. at 227; Philips, 450 F.2d at 1170. 
119. See Wyer, 655 F.2d at 227. 
120. See Browning Mfg. Co. v. Bros, Inc. 126 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 499, 503 (D. Minn. 1960). 
121. A separate issue, beyond the scope of this article, is whether they might bar patentability 
under section 102(b). 
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electronically stored data. This is true, however, of microfIlm as well. It 
can be used to produce a paper image but it is not, itself, such an image.l22 
Although not unanimous, the trend of the caselaw is to admit microfIlm (at 
least if it is indexed and members of the public can order printed copies) 
as a printed publication.l23 Furthermore, although it is doubtful that the 
Wyer court anticipated the development of the Internet,l24 that court did 
state that a document is a printed publication "whether ... printed ... on 
microfIlm or a magnetic disk or tape ... if available and accessible to 
persons concerned with the art."I25 Although transmitted over the Internet, 
the documents exist, at least initially, on a magnetic disk on a host 
machine. Therefore, under current caselaw, courts should not reject 
Internet po stings as printed pUblications solely because postings initially 
exist in electronic form. 
The Wyer test, however, also requires accessibility to persons 
concerned with the art. l26 In one sense, the Internet represents the ultimate 
in accessibility, allowing multiple, simultaneous access by individuals at 
the far ends of the earth. However, accessibility means more than the right 
to look, it also means the ability to find. 
The cases do not explicitly distinguish these two aspects of 
accessibility, but in order for a document to be publicly accessible, the 
public must be entitled to at least see, if not copy, the document127 and the 
public must be able to locate the document and distinguish it from among 
other, irrelevant, documents. l28 An interesting test of this latter point is the 
treatment accorded the United States Patent Office's own records. Once a 
United States Patent is issued, the documents related to its handling in the 
Patent Office (known as the "fIle wrapper" or "prosecution history") 
become public. In Camp Brothers & Co. v. Portable Wagon Dump & 
Elevator Co., 129 the court held that the contents of a patent application fIle 
122. Cj. Benchcraft, Inc. v. Broyhill Furniture Indus., Inc., 681 F. Supp. 1190,1200 (N.D. 
Miss. 1988). In Benchcrajt, the court held that a photograph qualified as a printed publication. See 
id. To be precisely on point, the court would have to have held the negative from which the 
photographs were printed was the printed publication. 
123. See, e.g., Wyer, 155 F.2d at 227. 
124. It is likely that the Wyer court was envisioning the magnetic disk itself being copied and 
the copies distributed. An Internet document would not be distributed in this way. Instead, the 
original document would more likely be stored, in digital form, on a magnetic (or optical) disk and 
distribution would take place by electronic transfer of the information over communication lines. 
The second copy of the information could then be stored on a second, remote, magnetic disk which 
would not be a duplicate of the original disk-it is the information content which would be 
duplicated. 
125. Wyer, 655 F.2d at 227. 
126. See id. 
127. See supra note 67 and accompanying text. 
128. See supra notes 72-76 and accompanying text. 
129. 251 F. 603 (7th Cir. 1917). 
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were not printed pUblications because of ''the practical impossibility of. . . 
the search" to find what "lies buried in some one file wrapper of the 
infinite number [offlle wrappers] in the Patent Office.,,130 
Internet postings clearly satisfy the ftrstrequirement (the "right to look" 
requirement): it would be hard to argue that information posted on the 
Internet was not intended to be publicly accessible.l31 However, even 
though Int~rnet postings satisfy the frrst requirement, current indexing of 
Internet postings does not satisfy the second requirement-the ability to 
find. 132 While indexing is improving, the task is formidable. As of January 
1998 there were over 29 million Internet hosts, up from 16 million in 
January, 1997, and over 2.2 million Web servers.133 As of 1995, over 
130,000 articles per day were being posted to Usenet sites. 134 The numbers 
are growing dramatically.13S 
On this ground, general Internet postings do not satisfy the 
requirements for printed publications.136 The underlying test of printed 
publication status is public accessibility. Accessibility requires more than 
theoretical access; it also requires the ability to separate relevant 
documents from at least the great majority of irrelevant documents. The 
130. Id. at 608. Since the Patent Office still does not provide a comprehensive public index 
to the contents of patent application files, presumably Camp Brothers would be decided the same 
way today. But see Vass v. Multi Med Indus., Inc., 204 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 1071, 1073 (B.D.N.Y. 
1979). 
131. An issue might be raised as to whether the posting was lawful. See, e.g., Sega Enters. Ltd. 
v. Maphia, 857 F. Supp. 679, 686 (N.D. Cal. 1994) (discussing copyright infringement when 
unauthorized copies of a game were uploaded to the Internet); Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Netcom On-
line Communication Servs., Inc., 923 F. Supp. 1231, 1241 (N.D. Cal. 1995) (discussing copyright 
violation in posting selections ofL. Ron Hubbard's work on the Internet); Religious Tech. Ctr. v. 
Lerma, 897 F. Supp. 260, 263 (B.D. Va. 1995) (discussing confidential church documents posted 
on the Internet). Even linking to an Internet Web site is arguably an infringement of the copyright 
of the linked Web site. See Futuredontics, Inc. v. Applied Anagrarnics, Inc., 45 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 
2005,2007-09 (C.D. Cal. 1998) (denying motion to dismiss such a claim). However, all that is 
required of a printed publication is accessibility, not the right to copy. Thus, cases challenging the 
scope of copyright on the Internet would not impact this analysis any more than cases challenging 
the unlicensed copying of a book or magazine article would impact the status of that book or article 
as a printed publication. Moreover, the issue would only be presented as to those postings where 
the poster was not the copyright owner. 
132. While there are a number of "search engines," such as Yahoo, HotBot, etc., there is no 
general index to the Internet, nor, as the figures suggest, is such an index likely to become available 
in the near future. 
133. See Robert H. Zakon, Hobbes' Internet Time Line 4.0, (visited Feb. 25, 1999) 
<http://www.isoc.orglguestlzakonlInternetlHistoryIHIT.htrnl>. 
134. Seeid. 
135. See id. 
136. This is not to say that certain specialized collections of documents made available through 
the Internet might not qualify if they were adequately indexed and known to those interested in the 
art. Simply because it is available on the Internet does not disqualify an otherwise qualifying 
document as a printed publication. 
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Internet does not currently provide this capability. 
B. Do the Implicit Assumptions of the Cases 
Apply to Internet Postings? 
261 
If the literal language of the cases were to be viewed as broad enough 
to cover Internet postings, it would then be necessary to examine the 
assumptions underlying the cases and to determine whether those 
assumptions were equally valid with respect to Internet postings. The 
official defInition of the Internet, to the extent there is one, is reflected in 
an October 24, 1995 resolution of the Federal Networking Council: 
"Internet" refers to the global information system that-
(i) is logically linked together by a globally unique 
address space based on the Internet Protocol (IP) or its 
subsequent extensions/follow-ons; 
(ii) is able to support communications using the 
Transmission Control Protocol/Internet Protocol 
(TCPIIP) suite or its subsequent extensions/follow-ons, 
and/or other IP-compatible protocols; and 
(iii) provides, uses or makes accessible, either publicly or 
privately, high level services layered on the 
communications and related infrastructure described 
herein. 137 
Internet pages are stored electronically, traI1:smitted digitally, and 
displayed as ephemeral images on computer screens. No literal reading of 
the phrase "printed publication" could seriously be thought to encompass 
such images, and even the most liberal interpretation of "printed 
publication" still requires a "document." For all the stretching of the 
statute, courts have dealt, at least at the literal level, with a document that, 
for the whole of its existence, was fIxed and unchanging. The majority of 
the courts gave "printed publication status" only where the document was 
safe-either widely distributed or in the care of a public institution.138 The 
Internet is an ever-changing landscape. While a thesis indexed in a library 
is unchanged and can always be found in that library, a Web page may 
disappear without a trace. As Justice Stevens noted in Reno v. American 
137. FNC Resolution: Definition of "Internet," (visited Feb. 25, 1999) 
<http://fnc.govlInternecres.html>. 
138. See, e.g., Ex parte Hershberger, 96 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 54 (pat Off. Bd. App. 1952). 
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Civil Liberties Union, 139 newsgroup postings are regularly purged. 140 Is the 
information "available" to the public if it once was but no longer is? Is the 
indexing system available on the Internet sufficient to assure public 
accessibility? 
The cases on printed pUblications appear to assume that: 
1. Printing evidences an intent to make a document 
publicly available, meaning, as discussed above, that it 
is accessible and can be found. 
2. Once a document has become publicly available, it will 
remain so. 
3. Once publicly available, the form and content of a 
document will remain fIXed. 
4. A publicly available document can have assigned to it 
a verifiable date of pUblication. 
The first assumption is easily shown to be correct. As explained in In 
re Tenney,141 "Congress no doubt reasoned that one would not go to the 
trouble of printing ... unless it was desired to print a number of copies," 
therefore presumably increasing the likelihood of availability to the 
public.142 In the Internet context, it is no "trouble" to make a number of 
copies. The attraction of the Internet as a publishing medium lies in its 
cheap and simple (to the end user) ability to produce a large number of 
copies, the number dependent solely on the demand for the information. 
Although the poster does not demonstrate an intent to make the 
information widely available through "the trouble" of posting, it would be 
difficult to argue that a general posting to the Internet did not carry with it 
the intent to offer wide public availability. It should be noted that several 
cases indicate that posters do not intend to permit unrestricted copying, but 
simply access.143 The printed publication cases do not, however, require 
unrestricted copying, simply accessibility, and to require otherwise would 
conflict with the copyright statute. 144 
A second, more troubling, assumption, however, is the assumption of 
139. 117 S. Ct. 2329 (1997). 
140. See id. at 2335. 
141. 254 F.2d 619 (C.C.P.A. 1958). 
142. [d. at 626. 
143. See supra note 131. 
144. Such a requirement would particularly conflict with 17 U.S.C. § 106 (1994) which grants 
a copyright owner the exclusive right to copy and prepare derivative works, subject to public policy 
exceptions contained in 17 U.S.C. §§ 107-120 (1994). None of the exceptions requires surrendering 
a copyright as a precondition to a work being a reference under the patent law, and such an 
exception would lead to the absurd result that the author of a work could determine whether or not 
an unrelated invention was patentable. 
1999) INTERSECl'ION OF CYBERSPACEAND PATEN/" LA W 263 
permanent public access. This assumption has two components. The 
assumption that, once released to the public, the printed publication cannot 
be destroyed or otherwise withdrawn from the public.145 And the 
assumption that, once released to the public, the printed pUblication will 
remain invariable. 
For example, an Internet Web page may be created and stored on a 
single computer. It may be accessed remotely by virtue of its connection 
to the Internet and its construction according to Internet protocols. It is 
possible that it will be duplicated at a so-called "mirror site," but 
duplication on such a site does not follow automatically from mere 
presence on the Internet. It also is possible that some or all of the contents 
of the Web page will be duplicated, either by creating an electronic copy 
on a second computer or by printing the page. 146 It is not, however, inherent 
in the posting itself that either will take place, nor is it certain that the Web 
page will be indexed by any of the automatic search engines in a fashion 
that will be accessible to those interested in the art.147 
It is thus possible that the decision of a host of a particular Web site to 
discontinue hosting, or to remove a document from that particular site, may 
in fact withdraw the document from the public. This would be analogous 
to the recall and destruction of an entire run of books or magazines; 
however, the difficulty of doing so is by no means analogous. Because of 
the considerably greater difficulty of destroying an entire edition of a 
printed magazine or book once published, the transfer of information 
through such a medium to the public domain is much more certain than the 
transfer of Internet posted information. It is also possible that decisions by, 
or events beyond the control of, a particular host will deprive the public of 
access to a document, either temporarily148 or permanently.149 Again, the 
145. Of course, if all copies are inaccessible, the issue does not arise. An interesting case 
would be presented if all public copies had become unavailable and the only surviving copies were 
in the hands of the litigants. 
146. Technically, what a user sees on a computer screen is not a copy of what is on the host 
computer, and what is printed from the Web page is not a duplicate of what is on the host computer 
(or, necessarily, what is on the user's screen); rather, each is a derivative work in the copyright 
sense. See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1994). The party hosting the Web page has considerable control over 
what can be printed and how it will appear. 
147. Automatic search engines, such as Yahoo, HotBot, Lycos, and others, index certain 
words; they do not index concepts. Therefore, unless the author of a Web page chooses words 
which would be used by the searcher to describe the concept that is being searched for, the 
automatic index will not locate the document This has particular relevance to the discovery and use 
ofinforrnation from analogous arts, where different jargon (or, even worse, acronyms) may be used 
to describe the concept of interest 
148. In 1996, subscribers to America Online and Netcom were denied access for nineteen and 
thirteen hours, respectively, due to lack of capacity. See Zakon, supra note 133. On July 17,1997 
an error at Network Solutions caused the DNS table (the table which correlates domain names with 
their Internet addresses) for .com and .net "to become corrupted, making millions of systems 
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likelihood of such an event terminating public access to a published book 
or magazine is remote. 
For similar reasons, the assumption that a posting to the Internet will 
remain unchanged as it is disseminated can easily be shown to be 
unwarranted. The data which presents a Web site are stored electronically 
in digital format. As such, the data, and thereby the image presented to a 
visitor to the site, are easily modified. Digital modifications are difficult, 
if not impossible, to detect.150 Thus, possession by the public of access to 
a particular purported copy of an Internet "publication" does not assure 
public access to the original information. 
Should the issue arise as to which of several purported "originals" was 
in fact the original, the accuracy of a fourth underlying assumption must 
be questioned: can it be assumed that the date of pUblication of each copy 
can be accurately determined? Two patentability issues are controlled by 
the date of pUblication: the so-called "critical date" under section 102 (the 
date on which the reference became available to the public and therefore 
available as a potential bar to patentability) and the general knowledge and 
belief of one of "ordinary skill in the art" under section 103. 
As discussed above,151 a reference can anticipate a claim to a patent 
only if the reference was either prior to the claimed date of invention or 
more than one year prior to the United States application date. Similarly, 
when determining whether a collection of references invalidates a claim for 
obviousness under section 103, one factor is what those of ordinary skill 
in the art believed at the time the invention was made.152 A document 
indicating that, on that date, the claimed invention was already known or 
believed to be possible would likely negate patentability. But a document 
indicating that, on that date, it was widely believed that the invention was 
impossible, would argue in favor of patentability. 
With a journal article, or even a single indexed thesis, it is possible to 
determine a date of public accessibility. Again, because of the electronic 
nature of the Internet and the control exercised by the host of the data, it is 
unreachable." [d. . 
149. In 1996, InterNic unlisted 9,272 organizations' domain names for failure to pay their 
domain name fee. See id. As noted in Reno \I. American Civil Liberties Union, 117 S. Ct. 2329, 
2335 (1997), ''In most newsgroups, postings are automatically purged at regular intervals." It is, 
of course, possible that prior to the demise of a site or the purging of a message, it will have been 
copied and stored elsewhere, but the test of printed publication status is continued public 
accessibility. 
150. Encryption techniques may be used to authenticate digital documents, but such techniques 
rely on independent knowledge of characteristics of the original document. Furthermore, most Web 
pages are not currently authenticated. 
151. See supra note 65. 
152. See supra note 9 for the full text of section 103. 
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possible for a host to provide an inaccurate date of public availability.ls3 
It thus appears that several of the underlying assumptions which 
allowed the expansion of the term "printed publication" in prior cases 
cannot safely be made with respect to the Internet as it exists today. 
Therefore, Internet postings do not constitute "printed publications" under 
section 102. 
VlI. IF NOT Now, WHEN? 
At fIrst glance, the question posed at the outset, ''Will the principal 
research tool of the next decade be considered part of this statute-defIned 
guardian of the public domain?" appears to answer itself. Although a 
concern should be noted as to the risk that the public domain will be so 
inundated with prior art as to make defmition of the boundary of the public 
domain impossible,ls4 the simple answer to this concern is that neither the 
Constitution nor the caselaw require an a priori defmition of the public 
domain. What is required is protection of the public by limiting the grant 
of patent rights to situations where the public benefIts by addition of 
knowledge not already in the public domain. 
With this goal, it is troubling to conclude that the dominant research 
tool of any future age will be excluded from consideration in patentability 
determinations. The fundamental rule of patentability is that monopolies 
are not awarded for what is already in the public domain. Therefore, 
whatever tools are available to place information in the hands of 
researchers should also withdraw that information from the reach of patent 
applicants. 
This intuitive response turns out to be incorrect, at least with respect to 
the 1999 Internet. The current state of development of the Internet does not 
permit data disseminated on the Internet to satisfy the requirement of a 
printed publication under section 102. The data is transitory, it is not 
necessarily available to the public (partly because of the absence of 
effective indexing and partly because of the ability to modify), it is capable 
153. The dale of posting would be a relevant, but not necessarily controlling date. Under the 
majority of the magazine cases, see supra note 65, the critical date is not the date on the cover but 
the date of actual delivery to a subscriber. The analogous date for the Internet would be the date a 
second party actually received (in the electronic mail context) or visited (in the Web site context). 
This data can be collected by the host, but again if the host chose to falsify the data, the change 
would be difficult if not impossible to detect. 
154. One factor not discussed in the cases is the braking effect of printed publications in the 
printing press sense. In order to have a document published by press printing, significant effort was 
involved and, not only did this indicate a commitment to public dissemination by the author, but 
also the likelihood that someone (such as a book publisher or magazine editor) shared the view that 
such dissemination was warranted. 
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of after-the-fact manipulation, ISS and it is not necessarily date-verifiable. 
Simply because data is disseminated on the Internet would not, however, 
deprive it of printed publication status if it were otherwise a printed 
publication. 
Having concluded that the Internet is not currently at a stage of 
development to qualify as a medium of "printed publications" under 
section 102, the next question is "when will it be?" More precisely, what 
must change in order for Internet dissemination to qualify? The simple 
answer is that the lack of assured, continued, effective accessibility 
identified above must be addressed. Anyone of three events could do so: 
broad evolution of the Internet itself, directed creation of a "trusted" 
subdivision of the Internet, or legislation. 
A. Evolution 
As with prior technologies, 156 if the Internet develops in such a way that 
makes it probable that a researcher in the field would find the data (for 
example, if indexing improved so as to make data retrievable and verifiable 
as to content and date of publication), then without more, data on the 
Internet would qualify as a printed publication. At least at the circuit court 
level, the line has been crossed too often and too consistently to fear a 
holding that electronic transfer, per se, will prevent a document from being 
considered a printed publication. The issues raised above go not to the 
electronic nature of Internet documents but solely to the current 
consequences of that electronic nature. 
B. Directed Creation 
Alternatively, an Internet library of specific data could be created for 
the sole purpose of making such data qualify as a printed publication under 
section 102(a). Recalling that the problem with Internet dissemination is 
that it does not meet the indexing, permanent accessibility, or verifiable 
dating requirements, none of these problems are beyond the technically 
achievable scope of the Internet, at least with respect to documents as to 
which a conscious choice of inclusion is made. 
One possible blueprint for a trusted archive which would meet the 
requirements of the caselaw would be as follows: 
Ownership-The archive would need to be owned (i.e., 
155. It must be conceded that Ex parte Hershberger. 96 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 54 (pat. Off. Bd. 
App. 1952). held that a thesis was a printed pUblication even though it was in a loose leaf binder. 
See id. at 57. Instinctively. a document in a looseleaf binder strongly suggests at least the risk of 
undetected alterations. 
156. See supra notes 86-95 and accompanying text (discussing microfilm technology). 
1999) INrERSECf10N OF CYBERSPACE AND PATENT lAW 
hosted) by an organization perceived as sufficiently 
independent of interested parties. Possibilities would include 
government agencies, universities, or independent groups 
formed for the purpose. It would be desirable, although not, 
under current cases, necessary, to make provision for mirror 
sites both as an additional assurance of continued availability 
and for the practical reason that demand for access to the 
archive might be high enough to overwhelm a single site. 
Financial stability-The owner would need to have sufficient 
financial backing to assure continued existence of the archive 
and access to the public. This could, in part, be based on fees 
charged for placing documents in the archive and fees charged 
for access.l~ 
Indexing-The archive would need to be indexed in such a 
way that those having an interest in a particular art could find 
relevant documents within a comparatively small group of 
documents. Thus, the indexing would need to both provide a 
likelihood of identifying relevant documents in the area 
sought and a likelihood of excluding a large proportion of 
irrelevant documents. The specifics would vary from art to 
art-a problem in nuclear physics could probably be focused 
more narrowly than a problem in furniture-making, both 
because of the relative ages of the technology and the relative 
specificity of the processes. 
Dating and preservation-The archive would need to create 
and maintain a verifiable date stamp associated with each 
document. In light of the inconsistent caselaw with respect to 
the critical date for library stored documents and for 
magazines,158 it would be prudent to store both the date on 
which the document was received b~ the archive and the date 
it was made available to the pUblic. 1 9 A technical solution for 
assuring authenticity and date of submission exists in 
currently available Public Key Encryption technology. For 
example, the archive could provide an encrypted electronic 
receipt including the original document and the date it was 
received. 
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157. No case has required that a document must be available free of charge in order to be 
considered a printed publication and, in fact, typically they are not. Magazines and books are 
typically sold; the Patent Office charges for copies of United States Patents. 
158. See supra note 65. 
159. Even ifnot required for section 102 purposes, this dual date storage would have the added 
benefit of providing evidence of the state of public knowledge for section 102 and section 103 
purposes. 
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Such an archive would also need to resolve other practical problems. 
Incentives-Even if deposit were free, it would involve an 
investment of time and it would deprive the author of the 
ability to withdraw the pUblication from the public domain. If 
created legislatively, deposit with the archive could be made 
a condition of copyright registration (currently, although not 
a condition of copyright protection, the Register of Copyrights 
can request that a copy of any registered work be deposited 
with the Library of Congress, and sanctions are provided for 
failure to comply),16O although this would only capture 
documents which the author sought to copyright, and could 
exclude a large fraction of Internet documents. In order to 
obtain non-copyrighted documents (or if the archive were 
created by a private organization with no power to compel 
deposits), some incentive would need to be provided to 
encourage authors to submit documents. 
Copyright-Anyone other than the author161 would need to 
deal with the author's copyright. Putting aside the issues 
which arise once the archive has a legitimate copy of the 
material in question,162 there must at some point be a 
document or electronic version transferred to the archive. This 
document or electronic version could not be created without 
the author's permission or an exemption from copyright 
160. Under 17 U.S.C. § 407(d) (1994), the Library of Congress may request a copy of any 
published work submitted for copyright registration. Failure to provide the requested copy forfeits 
registration. See id. 
161. In light of the question of who will have the incentive to spend the time, effort, and 
money, it is likely that parties other than the author will want to provide documents to the archive. 
162. Those issues would include: Whether viewing a document through the Internet infringe 
the copyright owner's rights and whether copying the document to the archive's storage medium 
infringe the copyright owner's rights oris it sanctioned by 17 U.S.C. § 108 (1994) or by 17 U.S.C. 
§ 117 (1994), which provides: 
Notwithstanding the provisions of section 106, it is not an infringement for the 
owner of a copy of a computer program to make or authorize the making of 
another copy or adaptation of that computer program provided: 
(1) that such a new copy or adaptation is created as an essential step in the 
utilization of the computer program in conjunction with a machine and 
that it is used in no other manner, or 
(2) that such new copy or adaptation is for archival purposes only and that all 
archival copies are destroyed in the event that continued possession of the 
computer program should cease to be rightful. 
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infringement. 
C. Legislation 
Congress could solve the archive copyright problem by legislation 
amending the copyright statute. It has previously created exceptions to the 
copyright statute, for example, fair use,163 library and archive copying, 164 
ephemeral recordingsl6S and compulsory licenses for phonorecords and 
cable. 166 
More directly, Congress could amend section 102 of the patent statute 
to address the Internet specifically and make it a print medium by 
legislative fiat. The section 102 denial of patentability over prior printed 
publications is not constitutionally required, and in fact did not exist as part 
of the statutory scheme unti11836.167 Patents are not based on a common 
law right, but are purely a federal legislative right.168 Congress may 
exercise the legislative right to exclude certain classes of inventions from 
patent protection,169 and courts have denied patents based on public 
163. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1994) provides that: "the fair use of a copyrighted work ••. for purposes 
such as criticism, comment. news reporting, teaching (including multiple copies for classroom use), 
scholarship, or research, is not an infringement of copyright." 
164. 17 U.S.C. § 108 provides that: 
[I]t is not an infringement of copyright for a library or archives ••• to reproduce 
no more than one copy or phonorecord of a work, or to distribute such copy or 
phonorecord, under the conditions specified by this section if-
(1) the reproduction or distribution is made without any purpose of 
direct or indirect commercial advantage; 
(2) the collections of the library or archives are (i) open to the public, 
or (ii) available not only to researchers affiliated with the library or 
archives or with the institution of which it is a part, but also to 
other persons doing research in a specialized field; and 
(3) the reproduction or distribution of the work includes a notice of 
copyright 
165. See 17 U.S.C. § 112 (1994). 
166. See 17 U.S.C. § 111(d) (1994) (requiring compulsory license for cable systems); 17 
U.S.C. § 115(a) (1994) (requiring license for distributed phonorecords). 
167. See supra note 41-48 and accompanying text 
168. See Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 146 (1989); Sears, 
Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225, 229-30 (1964); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1338 (1994) 
(conferring exclusive federal judicial jurisdiction over patent matters). James Madison observed, 
in The Federalist, that with respect to patents and copyrights "[t]he States cannot separately make 
effectual provision for either." THE FEDERAUST No. 43, at 272 (James Madison) (1937). 
169. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 2181(a) (1994) (excluding certain nuclear energy technology from 
patent protection); see also Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303,318 (1980) ("Congress is free 
to amend section 101 so as to exclude from patent protection organisms produced by genetic 
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disclosures, which were not printed in the 1836 sense, for more than fifty 
years without constitutional challenge. 
VllI. CONCLUSION 
The status of Internet postings as printed publications under section 102 
is, at best, uncertain. Applying current caselaw to the current state of the 
Internet would most likely deny printed publication status to this emerging 
research tool. It could be decided as a policy matter that Internet postings 
should not bar patentability under section 102: the potential ocean of 
information is too vast and unruly to provide the necessary likelihood of 
enforceability of patents to satisfy the constitutional mandate of 
encouragement for inventors. Alternatively, it could be decided that a vast, 
unruly public domain furthers the policy of the patent laws. 
Whether by statutory solution or private enterprise, a resolution clearly 
deciding the status of Internet postings as printed publications is preferable 
to allowing uncertainty to surround the principal pUblication and research 
tool of the next decade. A resolution favoring printed publication status 
(and therefore barring patentability of subsequent inventions) is currently 
technologically feasible, at least with respect to selected categories of 
Internet postings, and would be consistent with the objective of protecting 
the public domain. In fairness to inventors and to protect against loss of 
information in an ocean of data, the resolution should also provide for 
effective storage and indexing qf postings granted printed pUblication 
status. 
engineering."). 
